THEOLOGY

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EDITORIAL

This month will bring us once more to Septuagesima, with its pictured story of Creation. The traditional Lessons of the Sunday have not lost anything of their interest or anything of their importance. Our understanding of them has even gained much from that knowledge of popular physics and astronomy which has of late been put within everybody's reach. It is, indeed, no small thing that we should be assured by one of the most famous of astronomers that a sufficient description of the original creation of all material things is contained in the six words: "God said, Let there be light." The astronomer's immediate purpose was to sum up his conclusion that everything which exists materially is waves, either "bottled-up waves," which we call solids, or "unbottled waves," which we call rays of light. But in fact he was also calling attention to the primacy of the spiritual. It is not that rays are any more spiritual than earth or rock or lead. But the Architect, the Artist, the Creator is spiritual. In Him is purpose, a spiritual thing. It may be that it will presently be found that He is also Love. But at the beginning of the enquiry we do not know that. We only know that there is in Him purpose, a spiritual thing. Those who are familiar with Haydn's *Creation* will remember the dramatic moment when we approach the words, "And God said." The hearers are perhaps expecting a great burst of sound. Instead, we have the quiet voice of supreme, irresistible authority, the whispered Fiat of Creation. Then comes the sonorous volume of melody, "And there was light." All the laws and all the facts of physical science sprang then from the hitherto unuttered purpose of the Almighty into the beginning of that ceaseless activity which millions of years later was to be interpreted to the twentieth century by Sir James Jeans and his colleagues.

It does not seem to be well understood. A recent correspondence in the *Daily Telegraph*, initiated by an article on

Belief in God by the Editor of this Journal, revealed that, while some take their stand, simply and fundamentally, on the written Word, and only accept such science as will square with it, others find that belief in God is a relic of barbarism. It is curious that, just at the moment when all the really great minds are profoundly religious, much more than two or three generations ago, the average man is coming to the conclusion, either that science has killed religion, or that it would do so if it were given a free hand. And all the time the leaders of thought, whether or not their religion is theologically satisfactory, whether or not their belief in God is genuine Theism, are deeply religious men, and are all talking about God. It is partly because the average man is always about seventy years behind the times. He has just heard what was being said in 1870. But there is more than that. The exponents of religion have not succeeded in connecting religion and science. Religion is thought to be interesting but ancient. Science is thought to be modern and compelling. One of the less fortunate consequences of the occurrence of the first chapter of Genesis on the morning of Septuagesima is the production of the impression that Creation was an affair of long ago, and that it is now finished. It is an old difficulty. It arises from the habit of supposing that the pages of the Bible record the only instances when God has ever made Himself known to mortal men. Religion is something that happened long ago, in what are vaguely called "Bible times." There are two things which would do much to correct this error. One of them was laid aside at the Reformation, and is only available to those who take pains to procure it. The other is freely available, but is not used so much as it might be. The two things are the Breviary, with its *legenda* of the Saints, and the admirable modern output of missionary stories. Other things, too, there are which would enlarge the picture for us all, and cause us to see Church History in it and even our own spiritual experiences. But whatever there is, it is not used. We have considered the days of old, and the years that are past, and we have not considered anything else. Thus, in the matter of Creation, God is thought of as having presided over the beginnings of it, and then as having lapsed into a Deistic inaction. The doctrine of the Divine Wisdom which "reacheth from one end of the world unto the other, and ordereth all things graciously," is not remembered. Accordingly, such things as Evolution, or the Second Law of Thermodynamics, or the Fitzgerald Contraction, are not seen in their real setting, as part of the continuously-being-created universe, but as extraneous elements, perhaps even hostile to religious faith.

What is the remedy? The remedy is something that concerns this Journal closely. A friendly reader said lately that we did not cater enough for the parochial clergy. This may mean that we are too high-brow, or that we do not provide enough Pastoralia. If it is the latter, it is true. And the reason is that we do not receive articles on Pastoralia. We should welcome them, if they were well written. The charge, if made, of being high-brow does not wring our withers much. In the choice of articles, which is a very difficult choice, made from abundant material, much of which we are most sorry to lose the chance of publishing, we have the parochial clergy and the reasonably well instructed laity perpetually in mind. "I hear," said a friend to Dr. R. W. Dale, then newly appointed to Carr's Lane Chapel, Birmingham, "that you are preaching theology. They will never stand it." Dale's reply is said to have been to the effect that a hungry man will not mind the lumps in his porridge. We attempt to put before readers material which has behind it a good deal of careful research, and yet is expressed in ordinary, not over-technical language. This aim points, or should point, to the solution of the difficulty about Creation. The Lessons of Septuagesima bring before us the Beginning and the End. It is imposing, humbling, even terrifying, but remote. These are the two things which necessarily lie outside our own experience. There is no harm in it. It is good that it should be so. It is the function of Revelation to reveal. There is even a profound moral. Why do we at Septuagesima go back to the beginnings? A sentence from Dr. Kartashov's article in our issue of last month will make it clear. "The Nativity of Christ does not call forth quite this fullness of joy; in the future are still the sufferings of life and Golgotha. Only with Easter comes cloudless jubilation." As soon as the Christmas season is ended, sometimes even before the lights of Candlemas are fairly quenched, we begin again to face the fact that Creation did not proceed according to the Purpose. Grit found its way into the machine. Sin "sprang to life," as Dr. Moffatt rightly translates the Pauline *ἀνέξησεν*, and man "died." This touches us very nearly. And the Gospel and Epistle carry the situation into close relation with our own lives. The Gospel exhibits man as a worker, serving but not entitled to claim a reward of his own devising. The Epistle drives home the necessity of discipline and the peril of unfaithfulness. These are the human things. When, with all that in mind, we return to the first Lesson, we see that, while theologically the foundation statement is "In the beginning God," while scientifically the most interesting thing is that the first act of Creation is "God said, Let there be light," incom-

parably the most important thing for us to learn is that man is made "in God's image, after God's likeness." There you have in Adam, that is, the primitive, just-human, barbaric creature, who is newly going on two legs instead of four, and has only the rudiments of a conscience, the ancestor of Plato and St. Francis. Yes, and more than that. To him pertaineth the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service of God; of him as concerning the flesh Christ came, who is over all. This is where the parochial clergy come in. They battle every day with sin. They know that what matters is the salvation of souls. And the thing which makes them able to go on day after day, dealing often with very unpromising human material, is the conviction which possesses them, founded upon the great truths of theology, that man is made in the image of God and that Christ died for our sins and was raised for our justification. This makes it worth while to go on. It is not the genial optimism of one who is temperamentally sanguine, who can easily persuade himself that nothing matters very much, and that everything will come right in the end. It is a conviction which is summed up in the words *Sic Deus dilexit mundum*. The parochial clergy can never do without theology. They owe to it their hope, not merely of usefulness, but of survival. Without it, they are "blind mouths," dope merchants, cumberers of the ground. With it, they are instruments of Creation.

Two handbooks just published deserve attention. *The Anglo-Catholic Annual*, 1935 (C.L.A., 1s. 6d.), is a very useful possession. It contains a great many lists of Patriarchs, Bishops of the Provinces of Canterbury, York, Scotland, Wales; of Communities, Theological Colleges, Guilds, Schools, Homes, Housing Associations, and of churches where Communion may be received at any hour of the day or night. There is a scheme of short Bible readings for a year, and some useful information about legal matters, Church and Stage, Church Schools and the Convocations. There is nothing partisan about it, except that it does not attempt to cover all the ground. It confines itself to the ground over which the Anglo-Catholic is likely to desire information. Thus there is nothing about the Provinces of Dublin and Armagh, or Ridley Hall or Wycliffe Hall, or schools other than those of declared Catholic principles. There is one lighter touch, where, under the head of "Some Personalities," Mr. Gillie Potter is described as "B.B.C. and Music Hall comedian, ecclesiologist and student of patristics and all that." The second publication, *The Choirboy's Pocket-Book*

(S.P.C.K., 1s.), fulfils its purpose admirably. It is anonymous, but the two parts of it, the compendium of musical information and the general information about the Church and the duty of the chorister, are alike excellent. It is evident that the one part is written by someone who knows about music and the second by someone who knows about boys.

Church and Slum, the quarterly organ of the Church Union Housing Association, continues boldly to proclaim, as against the familiar growls of vested interests, that "bad houses, like bad meat, have no value." Mr. Ritchie Calder writes very honestly as a journalist who in his time has visualized the slums "largely in terms of headlines." Since then he has become a real student of the problem and a worker in the cause of its abolition, as may be seen from his *The Conquest of Suffering* (Methuen, 5s.). There are half a dozen other articles of practical value by recognized authorities, and encouraging reports of what has been done. The association invites churchpeople to make themselves acquainted with the conditions and problems of slum clearance. Pamphlets on the subject have been published and may be obtained from the Secretary of the Housing Association, 238, Abbey House, Westminster, London, S.W. 1.

In addition, there are four practical ways in which help can be given:

1. By joining the Housing Association—subscription 10s. a year.
2. By investing £1 and upwards in a public utility society in the name of the Church Union.
3. By investing any sum in your own name at an interest of 2½ per cent.
4. By taking the magazine, *Church and Slum*, 6d. each issue, 7½d. post free.

By the time of the appearance of this issue of THEOLOGY, the Editor's private address will have become "The Deanery, Exeter."

THREE MODERN APPROACHES TO GOD (II)

A DISCUSSION OF THE THEISM OF PROFESSOR A. N. WHITEHEAD, DR. F. R. TENNANT AND PROFESSOR A. E. TAYLOR

"The proper study of mankind is"—God.

III

Dr. Tennant and Cosmic Teleology

We now proceed to consider the approach which is made by Dr. Tennant and which he elaborates with extreme thoroughness in his great two-volume work *Philosophical Theology*. Of all modern philosophers he is perhaps the most completely empirical in his method, and he states his view of the proper duty of the Christian theologian in a most uncompromising way. "The classical proofs of the being of God," he writes, "sought to demonstrate that there is a real counterpart to a preconceived idea of God. . . . The empirically minded theologian adopts a different procedure. He asks how the world, inclusive of man, is to be explained. . . . He will thus entertain at the outset no such presuppositions as that the Supreme Being, to which the world may point as its principle of explanation, is infinite, perfect, immutable, suprapersonal, unqualifiedly omnipotent or omniscient. The attributes to be ascribed to God will be such as empirical facts and their sufficient explanation indicate or require."* It is clear from this that Dr. Tennant is a most conspicuous exponent of the attitude which was referred to at the beginning of this paper as typical of most present-day theology, according to which the question about God which really needs investigation is not whether He is, but what He is like. To Dr. Tennant "God" means the ultimate principle of explanation of the Universe; that He exists is self-evident unless the Universe is devoid of all meaning, but the content to be attributed to Him, whether He be powerful, good, personal, and so forth, is to be discovered by empirical investigation. This does not mean, of course, that Dr. Tennant's God is not the God of Catholic devotion and theology; it may turn out that his ultimate principle of explanation of the Universe is in fact that than which no greater can be thought. Before, however, we enquire whether this is so, one or two preliminary observations must be made.

In the fifth chapter of volume two of *Philosophical Theology*

* *Philosophical Theology*, II., p. 78.

there is a most valuable discussion of the attributes of eternity, infinitude, and perfection, which traditional theology has predicated of God. Dr. Tennant is rightly anxious to ensure that, if these terms are to be used of God, they shall have a definite, determinate significance and shall not be merely vague honorific epithets savouring, in the phrase which he quotes from Hume, more of panegyric than of philosophy. Nothing but gratitude is due for such an investigation; it forms one of the most valuable sections of the whole treatise.

Dr. Tennant distinguishes three main uses of the word "infinite" in Christian theology. It can mean either "devoid of all defining limitations," with the implication of indefiniteness or indeterminacy; it can mean "the limitless in number, time, or space; that which cannot be reached by successive acts of addition or division"; or it can have a third meaning, that of "completeness or perfectness";* and Dr. Tennant accuses St. Thomas, in common with other Christian theologians, of confusion in his use of the term. When St. Thomas says that the being of God is called "infinite" because it is pure, self-subsistent or not received, he is using the term simply to imply non-limitation by other self-subsistents,† and to pass on from this notion of infinitude as self-subsistence to the connotation of "an *omnitudo* of all qualities however mutually incompatible" would be, as Dr. Tennant clearly sees, not only a change in meaning but a change from sense to nonsense. There is, however, a sense in which God is an *omnitudo*, which follows immediately from His self-subsistence and which does not involve any contradiction, and this sense is precisely that which is expressed by the definition of God as that than which no greater can be conceived. We have observed earlier that *Ego sum qui sum* is implied by *quo majus nihil cogitari potest*, and the converse is equally true. If God is the one self-subsistent, then He is inevitably the *omnitudo*, not of all qualities however incompatible, but of all perfection. St. Thomas is quite explicit that the infinitude of God does not involve the possession of incompatible qualities. "Whatever implies contradiction," he says, "does not come within the scope of Divine

* *Philosophical Theology*, II., p. 140.

† It is important to make it clear what "non-limitation by other self-subsistents" means. Grammatically, it might mean either that there were other self-subsistents which did not limit God, or that there were no other self-subsistents. It is fairly easy to see that the former meaning is inadmissible because self-contradictory. For supposing, for the sake of argument, that there were two self-subsistents, then their co-subsistence could only be explained by one of them depending on the other, in which case the former would not be self-subsistent, or by each of them depending on the other, in which case neither of them, but only the compound of the two, would be self-subsistent. (And similarly for three or more.) Hence there cannot be more than one self-subsistent. It follows that, if God is, in the sense of the text, self-subsistent, He is the only self-subsistent.

Omnipotence, because it cannot have the nature of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them."* In other words, God's infinitude (in the sense of self-subsistence) leads immediately to His perfection; it does not, however, seem fair to accuse St. Thomas of "merging"† the two terms. Their close connection is inevitable, but that is simply because God's infinitude and His perfection are in themselves both identical with His essence and differ only in that they are different aspects under which we observe it.‡ Nor, furthermore, does it seem to be the case that St. Thomas confuses the use of "infinite" as meaning self-subsistent with its use as meaning indefinite or indeterminate, because this latter notion is quite foreign to St. Thomas's thought about God. Pure being is, to the Angelic Doctor, not vague or indeterminate, but supremely active and rich;§ to him, as Dr. Tennant realises, pure being is the most perfect of all things, because it actuates all things, and when we remember in addition that, to the Catholic theologian, this pure being is nothing other than the Eternal and Ever-living Trinity, we see at once how false is the idea that in Catholic theology the infinitude of God carries with it any suggestion of indeterminacy or indefiniteness. There is no need to deny that words like "infinity" and "perfection" have often been used of God with vague and overlapping meanings, but, whatever precise meanings we decide to give to them, there are two mutually implicatory facts about God for which they stand, namely that He is unconditioned by anything outside Himself and that He is the *omnitudo realitatis*, the plenitude of all that truly *is*.

In the discussion of God and the Absolute, Dr. Tennant has again much to say which is of the highest value, however much there may also be with which a Catholic Christian will disagree. His criticism of those forms of absolutism which reduce the world to an appearance, or which identify God with the world in its totality (acosmism and pantheism) is simply devastating. When, however, he goes on to enquire what we can really know about God, the limitations of his particular type of empiricism are very prominent. The plain fact is that he is not able, and apparently does not wish, to rule out the possibility of polytheism, though it is a highly refined polytheism which he prefers

* *Summa Theologica*, I, xxv., 3.

† *Philosophical Theology*, II., p. 141, l. 22.

‡ *Cp.* Gilson: "Il semble que la speculation chrétienne ait poursuivi ce travail [*sc.* the explication of the content for us of the essence of God] selon deux voies convergentes, dont l'une nous conduit à poser Dieu comme parfait, l'autre à le poser comme infini, sa perfection et son infinitude s'impliquant d'ailleurs réciproquement comme deux aspects également nécessaires de l'Être qu'elles qualifient."—*L'Esprit de la Philosophie Médiévale*, p. 57.

§ Cf. *Summa contra Gentes*, c. 43.

to describe as "the pluralistic conception of Deity."* That he is prepared to face up to this is a great tribute to his courage and honesty; there are few philosophers who would be willing to risk the charge of polytheism, with the uncomplimentary associations that it carries, even if they hoped to be able to shew that those associations were inapplicable to their particular case. To discuss this matter further, it will be necessary to examine the general trend of the argument by which Dr. Tennant claims to establish a theistic interpretation of the Universe; this is set out in great detail in the chapter† round which the whole of the second volume of *Philosophical Theology* centres and which bears the title of *The Empirical Approach to Theism: Cosmic Teleology*. The keyword of the whole treatment is "purpose," and five fields of fact are examined in which purpose has been claimed to be evident. (i.) There is first the epistemological fact of the adaptiveness of things to thought, in Thomistic language the *convenientia entium ad intellectum*. In view of the interpretative function which the mind exercises in knowledge, Dr. Tennant feels justified in concluding only that "things, or their ontal counterparts, have so much affinity with us as to be assimilable and to be understood," but that this "does not of itself testify that the adaptiveness is teleological."‡ (ii.) Then there is the adaptiveness that appears in living organisms, concerning which it is remarked that the overthrow of the Paleyan type of argument by the Theory of Evolution does not deprive this fact of adaptiveness of all its teleological significance. "The discovery of organic evolution," writes Dr. Tennant, "has caused the teleologist to shift his ground from special design in the products to directivity in the process, and plan in the primary collocations. It has also served to suggest that the organic realm supplies no better basis for teleological argument of the narrower type than does inorganic nature."§ (iii.) He next considers, therefore, the adaptation of the inorganic environment to organic life. Against the contention that different inorganic conditions from those that actually hold might have been equally compatible with life, albeit of a different kind, he urges that "the necessary environment, whatever its nature, must be complex and dependent on a multiplicity of coincident conditions, such as are not reasonably attributable to blind forces or to pure mechanism,"‖ and that the fact that the inorganic world is such that life with its purposiveness can emerge from it is an indication of purpose in the inorganic world itself. (iv.) The treatment then proceeds to deal with the æsthetic quality of Nature, and particular stress is laid on

* *Philosophical Theology*, II., p. 170, l. 7.
† Chapter IV.
‡ *Ibid.*, II., p. 83.
§ *Ibid.*
‖ *Ibid.*, II., p. 87.

the fact that it is just where Nature is most "mechanical" and least touched by man with his attendant abominations of factories, motor-cars, and the like that she is most beautiful. That is, Nature speaks to man of a purpose beyond herself, and, while coercive force is not claimed for it, this argument is pressed as providing sound confirmation of the purposiveness that has been already discerned. "Theistically regarded, Nature's beauty is of a piece with the world's intelligibility and with its being a theatre for moral life; and thus far the case for theism is strengthened by æsthetic considerations."* (v.) Finally Dr. Tennant considers the moral status of man. As has been remarked earlier, in his opinion "moral considerations supply the coping-stone of a cumulative teleological argument. . . . Isolated from other facts, and used only for the sake of their alleged *a priori* preconditions, they can supply no rational proof of the existence of God."† Kant and Dr. Rashdall receive short shrift, the latter being accused of ambiguity in the use of the word "existence" or, at least, of having illicitly assumed that "to exist" involves "to be in some mind" and of having argued from this that, since "the ideal is not fully apprehended as to its content by any individual [or] realized in any human life . . . there must therefore be a Divine mind in which its 'existence' is to be located."‡ For Dr. Tennant the significant fact is that "'man is the child of Nature'"§ "Her capacity to produce man must be reckoned among her potencies, explain it how we may. And man is no monstrous birth out of due time, no freak or sport[; he] is like, and has genetic continuity with, Nature's humbler and earlier-born children."‖ "Nature and moral man are not at strife, but are organically one[, and] the whole process of Nature is capable of being regarded as instrumental to the development of intelligent and moral creatures."¶

Even from so sketchy and imperfect an outline as the above it should be clear how impressive and convincing are the arguments marshalled by Dr. Tennant in support of his contention that "the only idea of a world-ground that yields an explanation of these facts [*sc.*, 'the multitude of interwoven adaptations by which the world is constituted a theatre of life, intelligence and morality'] would seem to be that of an efficient, intelligent, ethical being."** But, as he is careful to point out, "when we call this Being 'God' we are borrowing a name, but not any idea, from religion."†† Not even any "premature assumption of monotheism" is intended. What is claimed to have as yet

* *Philosophical Theology*, II., p. 93. † *Ibid.*, p. 100. ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 97.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 100. ‖ *Ibid.*, p. 101. ¶ *Ibid.*, p. 103. ** *Ibid.*, p. 121.
†† *Ibid.*

been reasonably established is that cosmic purposing is embodied in the world. But oneness of purpose does not imply numerical oneness of purposer,"* and the question of the unity of God is left over for later consideration.

There follows a very detailed treatment of Creation, and, in dealing with the relation of God to the world, Dr. Tennant finds himself in a very similar position to Professor Whitehead, though he does not express it in so sharply antithetical a form. "The human imagination," he writes, "most forcibly represents to itself the dependence of the world on the will of God by supposing God and time to precede creation. But, as early Christian thinkers found, there is no reason to convert this representation into a theistic tenet. One of them regarded creation as an endless regress, world preceding world; another taught that creation was not in time, but the world and time were created together. . . . A further refinement is made when God is conceived as *essentially* the world-ground or creator; not another cause in the series, or a being who might or might not have created. God *quâ* God is creator, and the creator *quâ* creator is God: or 'God without the world is not God.' . . . Thus conceived," he continues, "the idea of creation is free from the old puzzles concerning temporal relations. If God be a world-ground, there never could have been no world. The 'possibilities' prior to any Actuality, betwixt which the Deity has been thought to have chosen, are but hypostatised abstractions. . . . If we are to speak in terms of time, the theistic doctrine may be summed up in the statement that the world is coeval with God and is contingent on His determinate nature inclusive of will."† There are various suggestions scattered through his work which make one hesitate to ascribe to Dr. Tennant the obvious force of his statements in the pages from which the above extracts are taken,‡ but it is necessary to point out that it does seem clearly fallacious to argue that "If God be a world-ground, there never could have been no world," for it is perfectly possible to suppose that God is, by His very nature, a world-ground in the sense of being able to create a world, but is only incidentally a world-ground in the sense of having actually done so. From the contemplation of a

* *Philosophical Theology*, II., p. 121. † *Ibid.*, pp. 128-9.

‡ Thus we read that "the world . . . is God's utterance. Its nature depends on His nature and will, not His nature on that of a self-subsistent universe" (*Philosophical Theology*, II., p. 209). This is distinctly better than Professor Whitehead's statement that "it is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the World creates God" (*Process and Reality*, p. 492). Yet Dr. Tennant tells us that "God without a world, or a Real other, is not God but an abstraction" (*Philosophical Theology*, II, p. 168), in much the same way in which the primordial nature of Professor Whitehead's God is not "eminently real" but "deficiently actual" (*Process and Reality*, p. 486).

picture we can say that there must have been an artist who was able to paint it; but we cannot say that he could not help painting it, or that "there never could have been no picture." This is really the same fallacy that we noted in the system of Professor Whitehead, of saying that, because the world *must* (in one sense of "must") have been created by God, therefore God *must* (in another sense of "must") have created it. And the question as to whether time preceded creation or not is surely irrelevant to the issue, for we deduce that God need not have created the world, not by contemplating first of all a time when God existed alone and then a time when God and the world existed together, but by considering the dependence of the world upon God, as God and the world exist together in actual fact.

This may seem a trivial point, but it is of vital importance for our purpose, for a God who, to put it baldly, created the world because He had to is certainly not that than which no greater can be thought. It is therefore important to point out that such a conclusion is not really necessitated by Dr. Tennant's method. We have indeed to make our first approach to God by examining creation, but this very examination, while it shews us that He has *of necessity* the power to create and has *as a matter of fact* made use of this power, shews also that His use of it is not of necessity, but is an act of free and unconstrained will.

There is one other point in Dr. Tennant's examination of the nature of God which must be briefly examined. This is the question as to whether God is a unity or a plurality. It is preceded by a preliminary discussion as to whether personality can rightly be attributed to God. Dr. Tennant maintains that it can. "Empirically derived theism," he says, ". . . can allow that human personality is but 'a pale copy' of divine personality, or that God is the only perfect Person. But that is not to renounce speaking of the Deity as personal. Personality," he proceeds, "can be conceived as divested of conditions and limitations that are specifically human, and the resulting concept may then be relevant to the Deity without being exhaustive of the divine nature."* He rejects entirely the notion of an evolutionary deity. "The idea of a developing God who, like us, progresses to self-consciousness and personality, is," he insists, "indeed incompatible with theism." Proceeding to the question of the unity of God, he first glances at the well-known argument which asserts that "if we are to regard goodness and love as essential attributes of God . . .

* *Philosophical Theology*, II., p. 166. If Dr. Tennant believed in the incommensurability of God and creation, as traditional theism does, he would have to make use of analogical predication in order to ascribe personality to God. This is, however, unnecessary in his system, for, as we shall see, his God is not, in any valid sense of the word, infinite.

this implies that within or besides Himself there must have been another to be known and loved with all the fulness of His capacity to know and to love."* He is not very much impressed by this argument for a multipersonal Deity, apparently because of his view that God always had the world to love. "God without a world or a Real other, is not God, but an abstraction."† "There never could have been no world." If, however, what we have previously urged against the view of the necessity of the world for God be sound, the argument retains its force, and it will have to be admitted that, if God is, by His very nature, Love, then *either* He is a singular name for a plurality of beings, *or else* there are distinctions within the Godhead such as are required by the doctrine of the Trinity. And Dr. Tennant's criticism‡ of this doctrine of the Catholic Faith does not seem very convincing. According to him, it claims for the three Persons a status intermediate between the substantival and the adjectival which is inconceivable. But here he has surely missed the point. The three Persons are distinct and substantival (not, be it observed, three *substances*, but three *substantives*, three *hypostases*), but this does not involve that they are three Gods, simply because the processions within the being of God are *necessary*. Of course, if the creation of the world was necessary too, this would place the Second and Third Persons on the same level as the world itself, and we should be involved in something rather akin to Arianism. But the Catholic view of creation stands or falls with the contingency of the world. It is because the creation of the world is *contingent* and the processions of the Persons are *necessary* that we can at the same time assert that God without the world is still God, and that the three Persons are not three Gods.§

* *Philosophical Theology*, II., p. 170.

† The argument is that, while "a self or subject does not depend, *qua* an existent or as to its being, upon any object to which it stands in the relation of presentation and attention," yet "relation or *rapport* is essential for any existent's assuming the rôle of, and being, a subject" (*Philosophical Theology*, II., p. 167). This is, of course, exactly the argument which, in conjunction with the notion of *internal* relations, a trinitarian will use to support the doctrine of the Trinity. See further in text.

‡ *Ibid.*, App., Note D, p. 267 *sqq.*

§ It will be observed that throughout this article the view is deliberately rejected which asserts that contingency is another name for human ignorance. In saying that the creation of the world is contingent, we mean more than that we do not know in what way it is necessary; we mean that we know that, *given God*, the world could equally well either be or not be. And in saying that the Processions of the Persons are necessary, we do not just mean that we know that, as a matter of fact, God happens to be a trinity; we mean that we know (even though we cannot see *why*) that, *given God* (*i.e.*, given His *essence*), His triune nature follows as an ontological necessity. (The primary source of this knowledge is, of course, revelation.) The notions of necessity and its correlative contingency are indefinable, but are none the less (or possibly even all the more) ultimate because of their indefinability; and to identify them with knowledge and its correlative ignorance is like identifying virtue with cheese. The two pairs of notions are of entirely different types. (*Cf.* also A. E. Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist*, II., App. B, C, p. 412 *sqq.*)

The conclusion of our examination of Dr. Tennant's theology is therefore this, that although his radical empiricism is of the greatest value in providing a genuinely rational approach to theology, he leaves us with something less than the God of Catholicism. What his "rationalism" really needs is supplementing by the concept of revelation, as, for example, it occurs in the philosophy of Professor A. E. Taylor.* Dr. Tennant does indeed discuss revelation at some length, and he dismisses it as unethical. But this is almost certainly because he rejects the Chalcedonian dogma of the Incarnation of the Son of God. He can conceive no form of direct communication of truth from God to man except, on the one hand, through the immanence of God in the human soul and, on the other, by the oracular presentation of a ready-made formula. But the essence of the Christian revelation is that it is given by the Incarnate Word to those who seek Him in purity and lowliness of heart as members of the sacramental fellowship of the Catholic Church. The great dogmas of Catholicism were neither discovered by man through the immanence of God in the human soul, nor hurled at his head by the transcendent Deity. They were given implicitly in the life of Christ Incarnate, and became explicit in His Body the Church as men and women lived their lives in union with His divine humanity. Revelation, in the Catholic use of the word, is inseparable from Incarnation. One might even say that before the Incarnation there was inspiration but not revelation.† Revelation is the communication of divine truth from the perfect human mind of Christ to the human minds of His brethren. *Cor ad cor loquitur*, and it is only as men and women live with His life that they can share in His knowledge. And it is only in union with His Body that they can live with His life. Revelation is thus not contrary to reason or even disconnected from it; it makes use of reason as its indispensable instrument. The human reason in its natural and unsanctified state cannot go more than a certain way in exploring the nature of God; like the rest of man's powers it has been weakened, though not entirely vitiated, by the Fall. Thus far, and no farther, is its motto; it sets out on the right road, but only gets part of the

* *The Faith of a Moralist*, ch. ii., "Reason and Revelation."

† It might be urged that the great truths about the nature of God taught by the Jewish prophets should be described as "revealed," even if only in a secondary sense. This is largely a question of words, but it may be replied that the prophets, and indeed the Jewish nation as a whole, were an essential element in the preparation for the incarnate life of the Logos. In this sense one might say that the Incarnation was a gradual process not begun, but rather completed, in the *Ecce ancilla Domini* of Mary. In this case the Old Testament "revelation," secondary and preparatory as it was, was none the less dependent upon the Incarnation of the Divine Word. Had there been no Incarnation preparing, there could have been no revelation at all; and the only conceivable forms of direct communication of divine truth would then be inspiration and oracular presentation.

way. When, however, it is sanctified by the grace of God, imparted through Christ's Body the Catholic Church, reason becomes the organ of revelation and can complete the journey which it had left unfinished before. The great truth about God, that He is tripersonal and consubstantial, cannot be (or at least has not been) discovered by reason, though once it has been revealed its rationality is apparent.* Empirical theism stops short without it, but with it both the cosmological and the teleological problem receive their final solution.

IV

Professor A. E. Taylor and the Faith of a Moralist

The difference of angle from which the three distinguished philosophers whose work we are venturing to examine approach the problem of theism might be shortly stated by saying that, while Professor Whitehead's main interest is cosmological and Dr. Tennant's teleological, Professor Taylor's primary concern is, as might be expected from the Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, with ethics. Where, however, he shews his greatness is in refusing to restrict his field of view to any one department. In the discussion for which he is most widely known to the general theological public—namely, the essay on *The Vindication of Religion* in *Essays Catholic and Critical*, he bases his treatment on the three stages which St. Bonaventura discerns in the approach of the human intellect to God, the consideration of what is around, within, and above us, to which Professor Taylor gives the epigrammatical titles "From Nature to God," "From Man to God," and "From God to God" respectively. It is indeed true that the fascinating and epoch-making Gifford Lectures which he delivered at St. Andrews in 1926-28 bear a title which might seem to imply a narrower scope—*The Faith of a Moralist*—but it is hardly possible to glance at a page of these without seeing that their author is as competent in epistemology, cosmology, and pure metaphysics as he is in the field of ethics. Nor must it be for-

* One remembers, for example, the way in which St. Thomas, by his comparison of the processions of the Second and Third Persons in the Godhead with the processions of thought and will in the human mind, almost suggests that, by means of this analogy, we might have been able to arrive at the doctrine of the Trinity without aid from revelation. It is clear, however, that, as a matter of fact, the applicability of this analogy would only suggest itself (as for example to St. Augustine) after the doctrine had been received from some other source. It is an *ex post facto*, not an *a parte ante*, rationality that the doctrine possesses, *relatively to human reason*. *In itself*, it is, of course, the supremely self-luminous Rationality from which all reason derives. On the whole question of rationality see A. E. Taylor, *The Faith of a Moralist*, II., App. A, p. 409 *sqq*.

gotten that he is also the author of one of the standard works on metaphysics in our language.* He might indeed, without boasting, take as his motto the words *Homo sum, et nihil humani a me alienum puto*, were it not that he places on his title-page† a quotation even more expressive of the attitude of the true Christian philosopher—the declaration of St. Augustine that *Verus philosophus est amator Dei*. It is the combination, almost unique in our day, of the deepest philosophical insight with the humility of the practising Catholic that gives to the writings of Professor Taylor an importance that simply cannot be exaggerated. It will not be necessary to devote as much space to the consideration of his work as we have given to that of Professor Whitehead and Dr. Tennant, partly because we shall find nothing to controvert, partly because we have quoted extensively from him already and in such a way as to bring out many of the most important features of his approach to the theistic problem.

In the essay on *The Vindication of Religion* Professor Taylor first of all disclaims any intention of producing demonstrations of a quasi-mathematical type. As he observes, if this could be done, "faith would have lost all its value as a test of a man's spiritual condition; as the theologians put it, faith would no longer be a response of the soul called out by 'grace,' and could consequently have no 'merit' towards salvation."‡ He claims that "we cannot be fairly asked to justify religion by producing a different kind of vindication, or a fuller degree of vindication, of the 'religious view' of the world than the man of science would think adequate if he were called upon to 'vindicate' the 'scientific view' of the world."§ Scientific theories, as well as religious dogmas, have their difficulties, but the one thing that the scientist does not do in the face of them is to "infer that the whole attempt at the construction of a scientific theory of Nature has been a mistake."‖ It is furthermore insisted that, just as in scientific matters the expert to whom we defer is the trained scientist, so, in religious matters, we must not go for truth to "the man of thoroughly irreligious temper who has done nothing to counteract that temper, the merely sensual or ambitious or proud or inquisitive," but to "those who have within them at least the making of 'holy and humble men of heart.'"¶

From these preliminaries Professor Taylor proceeds to discuss the theistic implications of Nature. The argument from "motion," he insists, is in principle sound; "'motion' in the vocabulary of Aristotle means change of every kind, so that

* *An Introduction to Metaphysics.*
† *The Faith of a Moralist*, I.
‡ *Essays Catholic and Critical*, p. 32.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 38.
‖ *Ibid.*
¶ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

what is being asserted is that there must be an unchanging cause or source of change. . . . As long as you only know that A is so because B is so, but cannot tell why B is so, your knowledge is incomplete. It only becomes complete when you are in a position to say that ultimately A is so because Z is so, Z being something which is its own *raison d'être*."* "The argument is simply from the temporal, conditioned, and mutable to something eternal, unconditioned, and immutable as its source."† Hume's contention that the universe as a whole may be self-explanatory, while its parts are not, is unanswerably refuted, and the attempt of many modern "scientific" philosophers to rest in an "ultimate pluralism" is condemned as a denial of the validity of the very assumption on which all science is built—namely, the explicability of Nature. From cosmology the argument proceeds to teleology, and goes on similar though less fully elaborated lines to those of Dr. Tennant. "The orderliness and apparent purposive 'trend towards intelligence' in Nature . . . suggest that [the] omnipotent and eternal 'supernatural' is a wholly intelligent Will."‡ This is as far as the consideration of Nature can take us; "in the creatures we may have discerned the 'footprints' of a Creator, but we have seen no token of his 'likeness.'"§ From Nature Professor Taylor turns to Man, and in Man he sees indications of the character of God that Nature alone is powerless to give. "Within our own moral life we see Him with the mask, so to say, half fallen off."‖

The approach to God from the moral consciousness of man is worked out in great detail in the earlier part of the first volume of *The Faith of a Moralist*. The fundamental contention, which is urged time and again, is that the very nature of man as a moral being is to strive to overcome the transience and ephemerality of temporal life. His highest function is to seek that *interminabilis vitæ tota simul et perfecta possessio* which is, in the classic definition of Boethius, eternity. And this goal cannot be attained by concentration upon the goods of this world. "All are good, yet none can be enjoyed except in the season of life appropriate to each, and the enjoyment is always tinged by regret for what has had to be given up and unsatisfied aspiration after what cannot yet be."¶ There is no true "satisfaction" in the goods of this world. The possession which man's moral nature demands "must be possession of a 'thing infinite and eternal,' and this points to the actuality of God, the absolute and final good, as indispensably necessary if the whole moral effort of mankind is not to be doomed *ab initio* to frustration."**

* *Essays Catholic and Critical*, pp. 49, 50.
† *Ibid.*, p. 52.
‡ *Ibid.*, p. 58.
§ *Ibid.*
‖ *Ibid.*, p. 59.
¶ *The Faith of a Moralist*, I., p. 95.
** *Ibid.*, p. 105.

The nature of God is further elucidated, according to Professor Taylor, by the experience of human sin. Sin, he insists, is always "felt as personal treason against a person, yet not against our own personality as it actually is, but against a real personal embodiment of our ideal of good, treason against a 'living God.'"* "If," he urges, "we are to think adequately of the shame of disloyalty to our best spiritual ideal, we have to learn to think of that ideal as already embodied in the living and personal God, and of falsehood as personal disloyalty and ingratitude to God."† "Even where we cannot point to any member of human society who has suffered hurt or infringement of rights by the sinful act, the feeling still persists that sin is a wrong done to a person of infinite sanctity, a personal affront, an act of *lèse-majesté*."‡ It is typical of Professor Taylor that for him even the fact of sin provides an argument for God. There is a marked contrast between the fearless and, one might almost say, joyful way in which he wrings from sin the admission of the sovereignty of God, and, for example, the uneasy, though brilliant, rearguard action fought by Dr. Tennant. Dr. Tennant looks upon the problem of evil as an obstacle that must be overcome before theism can be considered to have vindicated its claim; "before theistic faith, however sanguinely it may be entertained by individual believers, can be redeemed from subjectivity and be pronounced to be reasonable from the point of view of common or Objective 'knowledge,' a solution of the problem of evil must be found."§ For Professor Taylor, on the other hand, Christian theism is the only theory which is capable of explaining the problem of evil at all. The "infinitely polluting" character of sin implies that "the reverence we feel for the moral law really is an attitude towards an unseen being of transcendent purity and holiness of character."‖ "The final peace of man," Professor Taylor concludes, "if it is to be found at all, can only be found in a God who is eternal by nature and imparts by His grace a 'participated' eternity of perseverance to the other party to the relation. Reflection on the moral nature of man suggests a being who is . . . the eternal something before whom we must not only bow in amazement, like Job, but kneel in reverence as the source and support of all moral goodness. . . . If Nature shows us only the footsteps of God, in man as a moral being we see His image."¶ In other

* *The Faith of a Moralist*, p. xiv. † *Ibid.*, p. 208.

‡ *Essays Catholic and Critical*, p. 67.

§ *Philosophical Theology*, II., p. 180. It is true that Dr. Tennant deals both with physical and with moral evil, but it is with moral evil that the *crux* of the problem is reached.

‖ *Essays Catholic and Critical*, p. 67, quoting from Professor Clement Webb.

¶ *Ibid.*, pp. 69, 70.

words, while the argument from Nature has pointed to a Being who is omnipotent and supremely intelligent, the argument from Man has indicated that He is also the supreme good.

The last stage in Professor Taylor's investigation deals with the argument from religious experience, "from God to God." He is well aware of the objections that are often urged to this type of argument, and willingly agrees that in the sphere of religious experience all is not gold that glitters. He will, however, make no concession to those who urge that religion is simply a matter of sex or fear, which can be explained away by "psychology." With the insistence on the validity, and indeed of the necessity, of analogical predication which he justifies elsewhere so impressively,* he points out that such terms as "love" and "fear," while they cannot but be used of our attitude to God, do not then mean "no more than when we say that we are afraid of an angry bull or that we love a young lady."† Furthermore, he maintains that "the problem is not how I came to make a certain 'find,' but what the worth of that 'find' may be."‡ There is a "specifically 'religious' character of certain experiences,"§ and he proceeds to analyze it. With Dr. Otto he finds the special characteristic of the "holy" to be not just unfamiliarity or formidableness, but "uncanniness." It "manifest[s] in some special way the presence of 'the other' world,"‖ and so evokes, even if in a rudimentary form, an attitude that can rightly be described as "worship." Not indeed that religion can rest on these flashes of "numinous" experience alone. "We need to integrate the 'religious experience' with the suggestions conveyed to us by the knowledge of Nature and of our own being."¶ It is this integrability and interpretative power of religious experience which both justifies its claim to general validity and discriminates between its true form and spurious imitations. It is well known that the most balanced of those who have undergone "religious experience" in its highest forms, the great ecstatic mystics of the Catholic Church, have always shewn great hesitancy as to the source of their "revelations," and have insisted, as a criterion of validity, that in order to be admissible they must make for the general unification of the personality and for advance in the moral and spiritual life. If, then, we can conclude, as it seems abundantly clear that we can, that Professor Taylor has justified the specifically "religious" attitude to our environment, we are now in a position to answer the question with which we are particularly concerned —namely, whether he offers to us the God of traditional Catholic theology and devotion. There can be no doubt that he does.

* *The Faith of a Moralist*, I., chapter ii. † *Essays Catholic and Critical*, p. 75.
‡ *Ibid.*, p. 74. § *Ibid.*, p. 75. ‖ *Ibid.* ¶ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

Of the specific feeling associated with religious experience, Professor Taylor writes as follows: "It is precisely the same feeling which has prompted, *e.g.*, the utterance of the words of institution in the Eucharist *sotto voce*, and inspired the old Eucharistic hymn σιγησάτω πᾶσα σὰρξ βροτεία, as well as the modern saying that if Shakespeare came into the room we should all stand up, but if Jesus Christ came into the room we should all kneel down. It is equally the same sense of being in the presence of the wholly 'other-worldly' which finds expression in such an exclamation as the prophet's 'Woe is me, for I am unclean, for mine eyes have seen the Lord of hosts,' or St. Peter's 'Depart from me, for I am a sinful man.' . . . It is the universal voice of the mutable and temporal brought face to face with the absolutely eternal; hence in Scripture even the sinless seraphim are said to 'veil their faces' as they stand before their Lord."* It would be difficult to find a more adequate description than this of the specific attitude of adoration which, as von Hügel reminds us, is the very essence of the Catholic religion, and there can in consequence be no doubt that the Being whom it requires for its object, and who must therefore exist unless the life of the worshipping soul is based at its deepest point on a tragic illusion, is the God whom Catholic theism demands. *Mysterium fascinans et tremendum*, the God whose very effulgence hides Him from our eyes,† whose utter transcendence and purity awe us into silent self-abasement, on whose will we depend for every breath that we draw and every thought that we think, and yet who loves us with a love of which the intensest human love is but the palest reflection, and which is expressed as fully as human terms can ever express it in the figure of the Incarnate Deity upon the Cross—when we pass from religion to philosophy and try to express in terms of thought the Wonder that our souls have seen and tasted and felt, what is there that we can say about Him save that in contemplating Him our minds refuse to admit that aught can lie beyond Him, since He is in very truth that than which no greater can be conceived? *Dominus meus et Deus meus*, cried the Apostle Thomas as he fell at the feet of his Risen Lord. *Deus meus et omnia*, repeated Francis of Assisi throughout his night of prayer, and Anselm and Aquinas echo their worship when they define their God as *aliquid quo majus nihil cogitari potest*. The threefold cord which Professor Taylor weaves as he follows in the footsteps of Bonaventura integrates with the cold conclusions of empirical inspection the warmest and most intimate secrets of the worshipping soul. By it we can be assured that the philo-

* *Essays Catholic and Critical*, p. 76.

† *Cf.* The line in the hymn (E.H. 407): "'Tis only the splendour of light hideth Thee."

sopher is not less of a philosopher for being a Christian, since the true philosopher is he who most truly loves the God who is revealed in Christ. We have not to leave our minds in the porch when we enter the church, or our hearts in the hall when we enter the study. It is when we take the imperfect and incomplete deliverances of our minds into the sanctuary where they are illuminated by the Light in whom there is no darkness at all that they receive their fulfilment and their perfection. *Credo ut intelligam* is the faith in which we set forth upon our journey, but there comes at last a day when we can cry in triumph *Scio quia vidi.*

V

Summary and Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was not to attempt a complete investigation of the theistic implications of the philosophical systems of Professor Whitehead, Dr. Tennant, and Professor A. E. Taylor, but simply to answer the question as to whether their arguments did or did not claim to indicate the existence of the God of traditional Christian theology.

We therefore tried first of all to define the Christian God. Starting from von Hügel's declaration that "Religion is adoration," we concluded that the only satisfactory definition was that formulated by Anselm and adopted by Aquinas, that God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived, *aliquid quo majus nihil cogitari potest.* We emphasized that, while this is the God whose existence the ontological argument claimed to prove, He can nevertheless be approached by arguments of an empirical kind, and we discussed various incidental points in passing.

The results of our discussion of the work of Professor Whitehead and of Dr. Tennant can be stated together. In neither case did we find that we were presented with the God of Christian theism, for in both cases a "God" was offered to us who depended upon the world for His existence. We tried to shew that the essential point that was lacking in each of these systems was the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, and that if this cardinal doctrine of the Christian faith was accepted, it was possible to account for the existence of the world without derogating from the dignity of God.

Finally, in the thought of Professor Taylor we found what we needed. The integration of cosmological and moral considerations with those derived from experience of the specifically "religious" type furnished a rational justification for the

Christian attitude of worship, and so for the God whose existence worship presupposes. We were led step by step from the Creator of the universe to the ground of morality, and thence to the specifically "numinous," and in the final conclusion of this threefold argument we saw amply vindicated the traditional Christian conception of God as that than which no greater can be conceived.

E. L. MASCALL.

THE INCARNATION OF THE WORD OF GOD

THE present paper attempts to state the grounds for the Christian estimate of Christ as found in ascertained history and in the work of Christ in the experience of His followers; and then to develop the Christian valuation in terms of modern philosophical thought. It is governed by the conviction that in Jesus Christ the Word of God was made flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth; and that any lesser estimate is inadequate and imperfectly Christian.

I

First, then, as to the historic Jesus. We must be very clear that the Man of Nazareth is known to us only through those who themselves believed on Him with all their hearts as the most important figure in history, and at the very least as God's vicegerent, Himself in some sense divine. We have no biographical knowledge of Him; every scrap of authentic material is given us with some Christological interest, as the results of form-criticism (with whatever exaggerations) have made plain.

That is to say, we have no adequate information as to the historic figure of Nazareth, Galilee and Jerusalem, upon which a sound doctrine of His person can be built. And for that reason attempts to fall back upon His "God-consciousness" are bound to fail on critical grounds, entirely apart from the fact that if this consciousness were different in kind from that of other men, the real human incarnation is denied by an Apollinarian conception of His person. Nor can we assert that He claimed divinity; such a statement is only found in the Fourth Gospel, whose historical value is practically *nil*, while its spiritual significance is overwhelming. Jesus made His claim to be Messiah, the divinely appointed agent of God whose task was to bring in the eschatological kingdom, a task which after the crisis of

Cæsarea Philippi He believed would be finally accomplished by His death. Beyond that there is no evidence of His claims.

And, again, His teaching cannot be the basis for any sound doctrine of His divinity. It comes to us in truncated form, given almost entirely in particular situations and to particular persons. Unquestionably it is of great value, and is not quite accurately described as merely *interims-ethik*; yet it is so inextricably associated with the apostolic view of Jesus' person that it is difficult to find there an independent claim upon our allegiance.

We are forced, all along the line, to depend on the apostolic witness. What we do know is the result of the life of Jesus Christ. We know, from the Epistles first and then from the Gospels, the impression which He created, the sort of person He appeared to His disciples to be; in other words, the total impact of Christ upon their lives. But note, it is not the Jesus of history in His impact upon them; it is the historic and crucified Jesus who was in some way still alive and with them. And in the last resort we are driven to rest our faith, so far as it depends on historic fact, on the apostolic faith. From that faith we can know that there was a Jesus, who taught about the Kingdom of God which He believed would come among men through His action, who healed the sick, who gathered a small band of intimate companions, who held common meals with them and disclosed much of His deepest thinking to them, who had about Him some air of mystery which awed and yet drew His followers, who died on a Cross outside Jerusalem, and who was believed in some way to have conquered death. But as to details, we must admit that there will always be grave doubt.

The Christian faith has been founded on the experience, first of the disciples in their converse with the risen Lord, and second of later generations. This experience has been soteriological; the centre of it has been newness of life in Christ, known as life-giver, power, strength. And such life has been mediated primarily through the Church, which in some way has been experienced as carrying that salvation down the ages. The Christian beliefs arise as the result of life with the risen Lord, after His resurrection (however that be interpreted), when the disciples became convinced that He yet lived and was in closest contact with them—a conviction continuously validated since that time. The fundamental data for an estimate of His significance is therefore the historic, crucified, and risen Christ, source of light and life within the fellowship of His believers, the Church, and especially apprehended in a central sacramental rite in some way connected with His death and resurrection.

Jesus Christ has been the centre of the Christian religion for

two thousand years. Not His teaching, but Himself as the content of His revelation, Himself as historic and experienced Lord—that is the heart of historic Christianity. Unquestionably it is true that what records we have portray Him as a supreme religious teacher, although His knowledge in many fields was defective; certainly His character is shewn as a perfect standard, and yet His real importance is that He conveys the divine life to men in a way hitherto and elsewhere unprecedented in human history.

I should like to quote some fine words of Fr. Alec R. Vidler on this point: "Christians have ever believed that He was more than a teacher and more than an example of human character; they have believed that in His human life, and more particularly in the events in which His life culminated, there was given to man a unique experience of God, who is the ultimate reality." It is to explain that fact that Christologies arise, for, as Fr. Vidler goes on to say, "in effect this means that in Christ there was an emergence of something fresh, corresponding to the emergence of intelligence at the beginning of human history. Nor is this just an abstract theory or an idle fancy. The credal dogmas of Christianity, which were designed to express and safeguard the convictions of Christians, were the outcome of an experience just as real and just as genuine as any other human experience. Moreover, it is an experience that can be, and is still being, verified today. The experience may be an illusion, but if so every other experience may as well shut up shop without further ado. The fact that it does not do so shews that it does not take seriously the possibility that all experience is illusory."

Christianity, then, is not the teaching of Jesus, nor the religion of Jesus; it is clearly and specifically the religion about Jesus, and not about the historic Jesus alone, but about Jesus Christ, historic and yet living for evermore. If the ethics of Jesus be taken as all there is in the religion which bears His name, we are merely somewhat refined Jews, we are not Christians. And if ethics in itself is religion, then (as William Blake said) not Jesus but Socrates is the saviour of men. The significance of Christ's teaching for us is that it reveals to us His own quality. As we share His Spirit, still alive today, we may know His will for our own lives and for human society; but not by an archaic attempt to go *back* to the Jesus of history.

As men came to know this living Christ and His new way to the Father, His power and life dwelling in them, His redemption of their lives from selfishness and sin, they were compelled to acclaim Him as in some sense divine. He was at last declared to be the Eternal Word of God, of one substance with the Father,

God from God, for us men and for our salvation become man. The Chalcedonian formula, adopted in 451, only crystallizes this fact of experience in hard and incontrovertible terms, as Mr. More has put it. It sounds arid, with its talk of the one person, the two natures, the indissoluble, inseparable, unconfused and unchanged nature of the union of the natures in the one person; but it really means just this one thing—that in the Church's life and worship Jesus Christ was known as doing for men what only God could do, as Saviour, indwelling Lord, Life and Light and Power, making God uniquely available for us.

To maintain this is all that the Catholic creeds and formularies try to do. As Canon Knox has said, Christianity accepts Christ "as entirely human and yet the revelation of God in terms of humanity, God revealed so far as man is capable of revealing Him," and it "rejects any interpretation of Him which denies the complete reality of His humanity, and also any interpretation which denies the right of men to offer Him the worship which is due to God alone."

II

The Christian Church possesses certain facts, emergent in our many-levelled world, which it believes to be normative both for our living in and our understanding of the universe. Without these facts the system of things would not be what it is, but something quite different. They are congruous with other facts in history; yet because of that which unquestionably they have affected they seem to differ from these other facts in intensity and value. Christianity asserts (and here many non-Christians would agree) that the Christian data may legitimately be regarded as the culmination of the evolutionary process on this planet, so far as it concerns man's relationship with Deity. Indeed, they constitute what modern philosophers call a new emergent (as Fr. Vidler says, "the emergence of something fresh, corresponding to the emergence of intelligence at the beginning of human history"); and this fact is recognized by Mr. Middleton Murry.

Mr. Murry is not a Christian, yet he believes that with Jesus there appeared on this planet a new type of *homo sapiens*, opening up to men a completer adjustment to the metabiological reality which Mr. Murry would substitute for Deity. But the Christian theologian declares that this view is inadequate to the Christian experience and to a sound philosophy as well. Such an emergence as that associated with the beginning of the Christian faith involves more than Mr. Murry seems to assume. Indeed, the very fact of emergence itself demands more.

Inasmuch as there is presumptive evidence for a purposive activity or nisus in the cosmic order, emergence implies the fuller expression or release of that activity in certain ranges, and particularly in the more advanced grades of the order. The process is not on a dead-level nor entirely uniform in advance; our experience plainly indicates that it is more "here" than "there," more "then" than "now." And Deity in Himself is transcendent of the process, although He is revealed and self-expressed in it. For evolution is not a self-explanatory concept; it implies an Eternal Reality in relation to which and by which epigenesis takes place. That Ultimate Reality is the God of the Christian, whose outgoing creative revelatory activity or Word is the nisus or purpose expressed in the cosmic process. Evolution is therefore a name for a richly varied movement which in spiritual regard is divine revelation from start to finish. Through the Word (the Logos) Deity informs every grade and level of being; but He is not identified with the universe, which is created and derivative. And He is never exhausted therein, but present and active in widely differing degrees of intensity and significance.

Such a position has close affinity with certain conceptions of the patristic theologians. For it may be recalled that at that time important distinctions were made in the work of the Logos. There was λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, the Word as an eternal indwelling mode of Godhead; λόγος προφορικός, the Word proceeding forth in creative activity; λόγος σπερματικός, present and working in men as the implanted and seminal Word, "the seed of their deiform nature"; and, finally, λόγος ἔνσαρκος, or, as it was later phrased, λόγος σαρκωθείς, the Word fully embodied or expressed in fleshly human terms. And the result of this final "humanization" of the Word was the "divinization" of man, θείωσις The claim which they made for Christ was that He was λόγος σαρκωθείς, the Word made flesh, the actualization of the Logos on the human plane and in human form, so far as that may be possible in genuine human nature and mind. And this was regarded as a metaphysical fact, with all the implications such a claim possesses.

Now if Christ in the whole impact of His human life and work, and more especially in what happened afterward through His death and resurrection, both manifests and imparts the divine activity in a uniquely full manner, releases into the human world a new stream of divine energy, creates new channels for God's power to reach men, makes possible to them a new relationship to Deity which is experienced as an actual fact, He may properly be proclaimed the peculiarly complete and adequate vehicle of God in man. The diffused activity of Deity in and for the

human race is concentrated at this point as a burning-glass concentrates the sun's rays, and by that prior fact of intensification renders them immensely more effective and powerful in relation to that object upon which they are focussed. In that sense we may maintain a qualitative difference between Christ and other men.

Along these lines our Lord can legitimately, even though not demonstrably, be seen as the full emergence of Eternal Reality in human nature on to the plane of human history, *deitas sub specie humanitatis*. To Christian faith He is God-Man. But Christ is divine as well as human, not by being utterly different from other men in whom dwells and through whom works the divine activity; rather He is fully divine as well as fully human in that He actualizes in human nature that transcendental divine principle which is at the root of man's being, but which through other men is only potentially or at best very partially expressed. Or, to put it another way, the λόγος σπερματικός or divine principle in man's being is united with our proper humanity in varying degrees of closeness; in Christ there is achieved on the human level the closest and richest union of the Logos and our nature. And this is no mere ethical union, but, as the Germans would say, a *seinsverhältniss*—that is, a relationship of essential being.

The view which we have advocated does not confuse the divine and human, nor is it immanentist. It is incarnational in outlook, safeguarding the transcendence of Deity, but insisting on the divine activity through the Word. If, in the whole cosmic order, the work of the Logos is prevenient on every level to whatever response may be given, we shall say that Christ is not man-become-God, but God-become-man; not man-God, but God-man. Here Christian experience bears us out. Classically that experience has always been a new life with God, who reaches down to man in Christ; we kneel before Jesus and adore Him, as the recipients of a great gift from on high; we do not applaud a striking human achievement.

On the other hand, it must be remembered that the developmental-revelatory movement is all of one piece. Contrary to the Barthians and to Fr. Thornton (in *The Incarnate Lord*), we have suggested no arbitrary intrusion *ab extra*. Admittedly in our limited experience the impact of God in Christ upon our small lives often seems to indicate a "wholly other," a catastrophic entrance into the world. Yet if it were that, it would lose its value. Not only would Christ be less than fully human and therefore not the intimate revelation of Deity on man's own plane; He would be without significance whatever, except

as an entirely unrelated marvel; and men would not see and love Him for what He really is. Only if every experience of goodness, truth, and beauty, all deep intimations of Deity and walking with Him, represent actual revelations and entrances of God into our life and into human history, can the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation be firmly built. It is just because Christ is no enigmatic figure who protrudes, in Bishop Chandler's phrase, into a materialistic world, but is rather one who harmonizes with and expresses the true nature of Reality, that He has profound meaning for us men.

The union of Deity with man so signally actualized in him is a part of the revealing process; but it is the most significant part, the definitive part, unique in that it adequately reveals to men transcendent God and the essential meaning, so far as man is concerned, of the whole in which it occurs; and also quickens the realization of that union with Deity for the entire race. Throughout the world system God shines and energizes in degree varying with the divine initiative released at its several points; and that in turn is determined by the extent to which such release is made possible by prevenient preparation of receptivity. The divine is always prior to and evocative of the response. In Christ God entered into and was united with human life to as full an extent as it is to us conceivable that genuine human life can receive and assimilate God—a process now hardly begun and one that will continue to the end of time. In Christ in His Church the divine energy is supremely and sufficiently given to men.

The world is sacramental; Jesus Christ and His Church, Jesus Christ in His Church, is the concentration of this universal sacramentalism at a particular *somewhere*, guaranteeing the more general movement and effecting its richer expression for our race as His life enters ours, largely through sacramental means, and lifts us to His own level of God-manhood. This fullness is different from any other type of life; it is the safeguard of the qualitative distinction between Christ and other men, a distinction found in our ordinary intercourse with one another and here carried to its highest revelation.

What of the future? Can the Christian facts be supplanted as the centre of the religious experience of the race? It should be pointed out frankly that the unique significance attached to them as the supreme and normative human self-disclosure of Deity, by which all other revelations and intimations must be measured, is in the last resort a matter of faith. "We walk by faith, not by sight." The belief is undemonstrated; and it remains undemonstrable. It is of course *intellectually* con-

ceivable that they may one day be supplanted; but for the Christian in his devoted life of faith and worship it is not imaginable. So far we have hardly plumbed the depths of the riches of Christ, and the Christian is sure that man can never come closer to the throbbing heart of Reality than in the Son of Man and Son of God, in whom divine and human are fused in an ineffably intimate union. In the striking words of Professor Webb, we may claim that "the manifestation of God in humanity centres in the movement of which Jesus . . . is the founder and guide," and we may go on to say with him that the "actual history of religion" is "the story of a single incarnation of God in humanity, culminating in the life and death of Jesus Christ and in His risen life, whereof the Christian Church is the organ and vehicle, with the capacity eventually to assimilate and incorporate the whole religious experience of mankind."

The Christian centuries have known the fruitfulness of these facts both as most fully embodying the nature of God and His purpose, and as conveying a rich and delightfully new quality of life that otherwise would be unavailable to men. They have seen that Christ and His Church establish at a focal point, in and for men, the whole divine self-communication, just as an outstanding deed of a great leader gives a unique and permanent disclosure of that leader's true personality. For the Christian facts they have claimed "finality" in the only sense in which the word has meaning in this connection: not that they shut off further revelation, but that they give a definitive manifestation of the heart of God's innermost being, of the meaning of the world, and of the real nature of man, with the relations of these three to each other; and what is more important, that they make sufficiently available for man that which he most needs, power to live as a son of God and a sharer in the divine life. *The* Incarnation of God in Christ with its stupendous soteriological results is for Christians the effectual and dynamic centre in man of an incarnation-atonement movement of God which in its totality must embrace not merely the human race, but the entire cosmos.

To believe is not always easy; as von Hügel said, "Christianity is a heroism." The way to the Christian conviction for each one of us is humble acceptance of the holy Christian tradition of life and worship. Untold millions of holy and humble men of heart, of every age and race and tongue, be they wise or simple, rich or poor, have borne their testimony that these things are true; that is the authority of the Catholic Church, without which we could not believe the everlasting Gospel. It is our unspeakable privilege to join that glorious company, and to

make, as they did, the great experiment which shall one day end in an even greater experience.

Patris æterni
Verbum caro factum
Venite adoremus Dominum.

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BY WHAT METHODS CAN THE CHURCH MAKE CHRISTIAN PRINCIPLES PREVAIL IN SOCIETY?

(A HAROLD BUXTON ESSAY)

OF all the recent attempts to define the relation of Christianity to modern problems two books have caught the public eye above others. One is *The Relevance of Christianity*, by F. R. Barry; the other is *A Preface to Morals*, by Walter Lippmann. Both these books have gained a deserved reputation among the reading public, because, however much we may question their respective conclusions, most of us are bound to admit that the manner in which they set out "the problem of modernity" is little short of masterly.

Lippmann pictures with consummate skill the unhappy state of the emancipated mortals of today who have staggered out of the prison house of conventions, tabus, gods, priests, traditions and revelations, into a promised land which has proved in the end to be nothing but a trackless waste under a blinding sun. Here he has ceased to believe without ceasing to be credulous. He does not feel himself to be an actor in a dramatic destiny, yet the powers of civilization force him to adopt their pace. They compel his body but not his mind, with a compulsion accidental, unnecessary, and full of mockery. He is conquered but unconvinced. He is disillusioned with his own rebellion.

To meet this chaos orthodox religion is powerless; it must always be commending God to men in forms which are no longer understood, and calling men back to a basis of belief which is everywhere discredited. The tangled interconnexion of man with fellow-men, and nation with nation, prevents the pursuit of any system of ethics which goes outside a purely personal sphere, and it remains only for man to express his maturity in

magnificent and self-contained detachment, like the Stoic of old who found his greatest enjoyment in moving through the world repeating "Quanta non desidero," learning to follow what the heart desires without transgressing what is right, impervious alike to fear and pain, and even to hope.

Barry, though arriving at very different conclusions, sees an almost exactly similar problem before him. There is moral chaos. Holy and venerable formulæ are useless to meet it. Authority is in disrepute because people are asking, not "What must we do?" but "Why should we do?" or "Why should not we do?" The magnificent unity achieved by the mediæval system in all departments of life has been too magnificent to endure. Synthesis has given way to specialization. Progress has been dissociated from the inspiration of faith. Life has lost its unity and become a number of specialized activities. Great areas of our life and civilization have ceased to have any reference to Christian or even moral standards. Art for Art's sake. Business is business. Man has lost all purpose in life, and the god of the modern world is luck, because man feels himself compelled, however unwillingly, by impersonal forces over which he has no control. Home life, tradition, and convention, all to which we could appeal to set the standards to regulate our lives, are fast being dissolved in the acids of Modernity.

But underneath all this chaos and rebellion so admirably pictured by Barry and Lippmann there is yet another upheaval taking place. The materialism of the Victorian age has led men as in other generations to the feeling that man can do enough for himself to dispense with the services of God, and the spiritual life entirely. Some were dazzled by the progress of science and man's conquest of natural forces, others by the advance of the British Empire and the progress of civilization. Federoff even believed that man, after overcoming all elemental forces and conquering space, could look forward to the time when he would besiege and overcome the last citadel—death itself. Idealism in one form and another reigned supreme. If men did not believe that evolution would solve all the problems of mankind and produce a super-civilization peopled with supermen, they were, as Lippmann points out, for ever blowing the trumpets of freedom and providing asylums. Wordsworth fled to nature. Chateaubriand to savages. Byron to Greece. Morris to the Middle Ages, and some, like James Thomson, to Hell. Others, like W. E. Henley, anticipated Lippmann by glorying in their stoical sufficiency, wresting from God the mastership of their fate and the captaincy of their souls.

As men piped so did the Church dance, teaching that moral

evolution would exclude sin, and that ultimately the Kingdom of God would be evolved on earth, where peace and justice, religion and piety, would reign supreme. This last statement may appear too sweeping; perhaps it is, but the doctrine of moral evolution is all too freely taught even today to be passed by without notice and censure.

It is commonly supposed that the Great War marked the end of Idealism. But this is all too often assumed without any reason. It is of course true that it produced a vast amount of disillusionment. Weatherbeaten heroes of the Empire, who lived to see their children groaning under a heritage of economic ruin, were of course tempted to exclaim "All is vanity." But it can hardly be denied that the post-war situation which Barry and Lippmann picture has proved, despite all the discontent and disillusionment which characterize it, one of the most fruitful spawning grounds of idealism which there has ever been. We have only to look at the world around us to see that this is so. Soviet Russia has denied God in order to bring divine perfection of state and society to earth. Spain is following its example. Sanguine spirits in Ireland are envisaging a Utopia. In world politics as a whole, and particularly in China, we are told, idiotic slogans are accorded as much veneration as they deserve contempt, and have acquired in numerous minds the force of a supernatural law. Wells and Bertrand Russell are plying us with systems which they assure us are conducive to the salvation of society and the regeneration of mankind. Lippmann would have us take our way through the vale of woe along the pa th of Neo-Stoicism. Everywhere men cast vaguely round for an earthly saviour who will suddenly provide a solution for problems hitherto unsolved. Christ has been bereft of His divinity and placed in the gallery along with other human pioneers in the realm of ethics, to be revered as a teacher and an example and nothing more. Men still cling feverishly to the doctrine of evolution, believing that man who has advanced so far from apeship and missing-linkhood has a great future before him. It is sad enough to see people within the Church prostrating themselves at the shrine of science. It is even sadder to see people outside it believing in evolution, not as a method of creation, but as something which supplants the Creator, holding that man must ever progress, yet blindly unaware of his retrogressions. It must surely be admitted that post-war years have not brought a cessation of Idealism, but rather a renewed outburst of it; a desperate affirmation of faith in human achievement in the face of all the facts and evidence which tend to destroy our faith in it.

Yet behind this great rampart of humanistic endeavour the

morale of the troops is dwindling. There is a feeling abroad even among the atheists that, after all, the last word on life has been said by the author of Ecclesiastes. Human achievement and social progress has not led whither it seemed to lead. Ideals and Utopias have eluded us like mirages. The same civilization which has brought us hospitals, anæsthetics, doctors, aeroplanes, wireless, old age pensions, improvement of working conditions, and so forth, has brought in its wake economic and moral chaos, a decline in the arts, and bloodshed such as the world had never before seen. As soon as the pioneers build new roads of progress over untrodden ground the old work crumbles behind them. Finally, even the scientists themselves, if indeed the late Sir Alfred Ewing's speech at a recent meeting of the British Association may fairly be considered a sign of the times, have uttered the cry, "Man has learnt to master nature, before he has learnt to master himself." Scientists have reached the promised land not as men who seek to lead triumphant humanity in behind them, but as men who fear to divulge the great secrets of the universe to a mankind which they feel is too irresponsible to share the secrets with them.

Idealism has collapsed, but not so the idealist. He will persist, and in his persistence we must leave him.

In the meantime, how has all this affected the course of Christianity? Some people who welcomed the emancipation from Christianity and Christian standards have fled back to them. They have realized that there is a spiritual life, and that it is not just a hierarchical fiction, and have willingly returned to the fold of the Church and a full acceptance of orthodox dogma. But many more who have equally recognized the existence of the spiritual have flatly rejected any attempt at a corporate expression of the spiritual life. One does not have to read the press to any great extent to observe the number of people who want Christ without His bride the Church. They want a simple personal relationship between creature and Creator; which usually consists in a vague reverence for a God who is simply a fiction of the world-weary brain. Church and sacraments must stand aside that Christ may be revealed as teacher and example. The Bible is read because people find in such passages as the Sermon on the Mount an emotional satisfaction of their yearnings after beauty, truth, and goodness, or a sentimental fulfilment of their ethical ideals, and having thus disposed of the irrelevancies of Theology lay claim to possess a practical Christianity, which is in fact nothing more than a self-centred ethicism which has nothing in common with religion.

Such, then, is society in which we are to discover how Christian principles can be made to prevail.

Before we can proceed any further with the matter in hand we must ask ourselves the question, "What are Christian principles?" A principle is the foundation of belief or practice, and today, particularly with reference to Christianity, there is a serious tendency to confuse Christian principles with Christian practices, which has resulted in confounding practice with the basis of action. One commonly hears of principles being called Christian principles which are not Christian principles at all, but ethical principles. "Love your neighbour" is not a Christian principle, unless the Church is to claim a monopoly of humanitarian ethic; it is purely an ethical principle, though it may be a Christian practice. Our definition of Christian principles must depend on what we consider Christ Himself to have been. If He was an ethical teacher, then Christian and ethical principles may be synonymous. If we do not limit our conception of Christ to that of an ethical teacher, but enlarge it to believing Him to be the Son of God manifest in flesh and blood, then we must recast our definition of Christian principles.

This consideration turns us in upon the study of our Christology, and here it will be found that theologians have of recent years undergone a complete change of front.

Up till quite recently the general tendency of theology has been to suggest that the Gospels bear record to a figure which was in essence a simple ethical teacher and an example for all time and to all men. Over this figure Hellenistic and Jewish conceptions were held to have been overlaid. He was constituted Son of God and Messiah. His significance was further obscured when the "subjective and ethical" message of the Cross was transformed into the objective or sacrificial idea of the atonement. Finally, the simple figure was further encrusted in sacramental notions all of which must be swept away in order to reveal Christ as He actually was. This sweeping away of sacramentalism and overlaid Christologies was thought to be recapturing the Jesus of History.

But a still more recent school of theologians, starting out with the same quest, to recover the Jesus of History, have come to startlingly different conclusions. This school is ably represented in the recent publication of Sir Edwyn Hoskyns and Mr. Noel Davey, *The Riddle of the New Testament*. Their findings may be summarized as follows in their own words (p. 248): "What, then, in fact does emerge? First a clear negative conclusion. A biography of Jesus cannot be provided. Further, no single incident in His life or fragment of His teaching, if it be isolated from its context and detached, can be rendered intelligible, even if it be judged to be historical. From a mere collection of fragments, selected from the whole tradition and arbi-

trarily declared authentic, no outline of the concrete figure of Jesus can be drawn which for one moment carries conviction. If such a selective method be adopted, we might picture a religious personality who taught the 'Brotherhood of Men,' or the 'Fatherhood of God,' or we might roughly sketch an ethical system on the basis of a few aphorisms, and suppose that Jesus was a teacher of ethical principles, or we might sketch the career of a reformer of Jewish piety, or we might discover a religious mystic or disclose a man possessed of intense spiritual insight depending upon a peculiar religious experience, or indeed by piecing together a different selection of fragments, we might equally well describe the epiphany of a Divine Person, who at no point touched human life as we know it." Page 261: "It must be quite definitely affirmed that neither the Jesus of History nor the Primitive Church fits into the characteristic nexus of modern popular humanitarian or humanistic ideas." "The Gospel was as much a scandal to the first century as it is to the twentieth." "Primitive Christians found the Revelation of God in an historical figure so desperately human that there emerged within the early Church a faith in men and women so deeply rooted as to make modern humanitarians seem doctrinaire and trivial." Page 254: "Language descriptive of human heroism is entirely foreign to the New Testament. The event of the life and death of Jesus was not thought of as a human act, but as an act of God wrought out in human flesh and blood, which is a very different matter." "The concrete event which was Jesus of Nazareth was for them the sphere in which God had effected a mighty action for the salvation of man." Page 263: "Finally, then, the New Testament contains everywhere a concrete and exclusive claim to provide the revelation which solves the deepest problems of human life; it claims also everywhere a concrete and exclusive claim that a decision concerning this revelation is urgent. These claims rest, not upon speculations of men as to the meaning of myth, not upon the gradual imposition of exotic conceptions upon an ethic, in which the historical circumstances of its emergence were trivial, but upon a history which was consciously conditioned by the staggering claim that it was the very Act of God."

Such are the results of a modern critical analysis of the New Testament, and if we regard them as having any significance we must surely admit that they absolutely preclude the confusion of Christian with ethical principles. On this view of Christology our Christmas message is no longer "Peace on earth and good will towards men"—that popular misrendering of the text—it is rather "I have set in Sion a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence." The Jesus of History is no longer a

pattern and fulfiller of ideals, but a figure which confronts us provocatively in the babe of Bethlehem and the Christ crucified, in itself an offence and a scandal to us, just as to the Jews and Greeks. The Act of God wrought out in human flesh and blood, the emergence of the eternal into history, the concrete facts of the figure of the Jesus of History, our belief in these facts as set forth in our creed, and controlled by the history which gave rise to those beliefs—these and nothing less than these have any title to be called Christian principles, for they are the factors which constitute the basis of all Christian belief and practice. Ethics and ethical principles are the sphere in which we express in action our attitude to life and to God when we believe our destiny to be controlled by the divine revelation as set forth in Christ. It is of paramount importance not to confuse this resultant action with the belief which is the basis of that action. If we do this we entirely misunderstand the meaning of the term Christian principles.

If now we should still feel that the new attitude to the Jesus of History, and the definition of the term "Christian principles" which this Christology demands, is a freak of the higher criticism rather than an attempt to be practical, we could hardly do better than stop to consider for a moment the line of thought pursued by the Barthian school, and in particular as represented by Emil Brunner.

Emil Brunner has taken up the pen where Sir Edwyn Hoskyns has laid it down, and has demonstrated in the most convincing manner that the results of Sir Edwyn's type of critical work have an infinitely more practical application to the facts of life than much that is today assumed to be practical Christianity, but which has in fact little in common with religion at all.

In *The Word and the World* Brunner draws a distinction between Revelation and "Timeless Truth." Timeless truths are truths like the law of gravity, which human nature can put forth enough mental energy to grasp and to hold once for all. Revelation is not of this category. We do not apprehend Revelation by moral or mental effort. It comes to us as we are. "In the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom knew not God . . . but God chose the foolish things of the world that He might put to shame them that are wise, . . . that no flesh should glory before God." Revelation is an impact of eternal upon temporal, not a product of temporal ideology. In the *Theology of Crisis* Brunner contends that it is of paramount importance to regard Christ as a Revelation of this order if His work of salvation is to have any relevance to human life at all. "Jesus," he writes, "is not meant to be the teacher, the religious genius, the champion and revealer of the highest moral

code, and the example of the purest religious and ethical life. A teacher, as Socrates shews, teaches only what is latent in the student. He says nothing essentially new, and therefore cannot be the bearer of true salvation. Even the loftiest example of religious morality does not help us. He may lead us on a step, but he will never lead us out of godlessness. The teacher and example belong to us, not to God. Jesus as the most perfect embodiment of the highest religious idea is not a revealer, and therefore not a saviour. As such He does not come TO the world. He is OF the world, a product of its immanent possibilities. How Jesus found God, how He prayed, how He lived, is not a divine revelation for us; then He would be merely a religious man who differs from others because He represents a higher degree of religion. If Jesus is merely a teacher, example, genius, then it does not matter whether He lived or not." It is just here that the strength of the Barthian school and of Sir Edwyn Hoskyns' Christology lies. These theologians do not ask us to view with vain regret a historical figure who found God and trod a path which we cannot follow, and, most ironical of all, call that practical Christianity. They bid us recognize in Christ the saving revelation of God, solving once for all the problems of human nature; and hence of the supremest relevance to human needs.

It is unnecessary to remark that the appearance of Barthian doctrines in England, with their revived emphasis on soteriology, has produced in the minds of adverse critics a state bordering on hysteria. Taunts such as "creed of despair," "doctrine of pessimism," are everywhere flung at Barth and his followers. The reason is never far to seek, and that reason is a wholly deficient sense of sin. There is still a widespread feeling that the mission of Christ was to improve imperfect man, rather than to save sinful man. There is still a belief that the magnificence of human adventure and enterprise deserves the reward of the sheep, not of the goats. Sin has come to be regarded as an unfortunate breach between God and man which can be overpassed by shovelling in moral effort, and that our Saviour Christ came, at best, to shew us a short cut to a divine perfection, which, given time, human nature could achieve itself. In other words, the Atonement was convenient but not necessary. But human nature is sinful. We suffer from an inherent inability ever to hit the mark of divine perfection. If there is a gulf between God and man, it can never be bridged from our side. Perfection when it comes must be given to us, not achieved by us. We have no scriptural warrant for exalting the parable of the sheep and goats to a degree which excludes the necessity of atonement.

Access to God in Christ is not one of many ways to God, or even the shortest cut to God. It is the only way, because it is the only road from the divine side. We cannot begin to be Christians till our recognition of sin has made us despair, and our very pessimism has made us welcome the Saviour Christ in desperation. We need a creed of despair, for that alone gives us hope. Christ came to save us from our sins and in our sins, not to found a religion which would one day evolve a perfect society or a perfect man on earth.

It is time now to consider how these results should reflect on our conception of the Church and its relation to the world. This deficient sense of sin to which we have referred has had the most unfortunate results in this particular connexion. The Church has long been, and still is in many quarters, regarded as a society for corporate effort to live up to moral ideals. It has been free-wheeling for a long time upon standards of morals which have no motive power. It has regarded with satisfaction the number of more or less "moral pagans" who live up to "an unconscious heritage of Christian ideals"; and now that people have begun to point out that you can be good without being a Christian, the Church has sought to parry this very justifiable charge with arguments as specious as they are unconvincing. Theologians have with good reason come to doubt the relevance of Christianity, and sought to remedy the defect by, as it were, withdrawing Christian ethics from circulation and re-issuing them in a more up-to-date form, only to find with disappointment that they still suffer from the original tinge of irrelevance. There is still an erroneous idea abroad that the Church is something for which one qualifies by moral standards. This has led people to come to church, not seeking salvation, but trusting rather that the "some good in human nature," which we hear so much about nowadays, will inspire God to improve it. In fact, the Church ought to have no use for the ninety and nine just persons that need no repentance. There is only one moral qualification for church membership; that is a desire to be saved from sin and to worship the Saviour. The characters of the Gospel story who moved in spheres of ideals and high moral standards crucified Christ. They did not recognize the need of Him. The people who looked for one who would give "knowledge of salvation unto his people for the remission of their sins" were desperate and welcomed a Saviour. When our churches are once again filled with desperate people who wish to be saved from their sins, who worship One whom they truly, not half-heartedly, believe to be the only Saviour, and the one God revealed in Him, after whose will they consciously strive to direct their lives, then the sharp delineation between Church and world will reappear. And only

in a Church where people honestly believe that they have found in Christ what cannot be found elsewhere is the society where Christian principles can in any sense be said to prevail. Christian moral standards, or moral standards achieved by Christians, will, of course, overflow into pagan society; but Christian principles can only *prevail* within the Church among people to whom has been preached not the message of fulfilment of ideals of beauty, truth, and goodness, but the God revealed in Christ who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven and was incarnate.

We have finally one criticism to meet. Professor Berdyaev, in a recent article in *Christendom* on Human Activity, reminds us of the stock Marxian criticism of Christianity, that doctrines of the Fall and the Grace of God lead men to wait upon earth, sinning in expectant stagnation, until such a time as God shall see fit to intervene. This certainly is an admonition to which the adherents of the transcendentalist school of theology do well to listen. We need to remember that if the Church preaches the Redemption of mankind, it preaches also the redemption of human achievement. The fact that God has acted on our behalf does not exclude our responsibility to co-operate. The fact that we are justified by faith does not exclude the necessity of moral effort as evidence of a whole-hearted self-committal to the will of Him on whom we believe. The necessity of the Atonement ought to produce the impression that human achievement, if godless, is erring and futile; but it also ought to convince us that human achievement, like human nature, need not be the empty mockery that we choose to make it, but can be directed towards God as having an eternal value. The object of the redemption is to bring our whole lives into line with the purpose of God, even though our lives will continue to stray from this purpose inasmuch as we are and will always be sinful. But because our whole nature is redeemed we may rest assured that for that very reason moral and ethical effort, inasmuch as it is offered up to God with our lives, is neither purposeless nor futile, but essential to that active sacrifice of self, soul, and body which constitutes the life of the Christian upon earth. But it must be emphasized that where salvation has not been preached this scale of values will never be understood.

So, then, our final answer to the question, "By what methods can the Church make Christian principles prevail in society?" must be, "By endeavouring to become, so far as is possible, commensurate with society, without losing consciousness of its essential character." To suggest that "Christian principles" can prevail in society where God's revelation in Christ is not accepted can only be the result of a total misconception of the term.

E. J. SIMPSON.

MISCELLANEA

CHRIST AND PHILOSOPHY

PLATO'S conception of the Deity became generally recognized in Greek thought, and this was so closely akin to the Jewish idea that there could be little opposition; but the case was far different when men proceeded to ask how they were to picture the method of God's influence upon the world, for here the Jews had no definite philosophy: it was one of the great problems which Greek thought launched upon the world, and many rival solutions of the problem had been offered. It was possible that God left the world severely alone. It was possible that He influenced it only by means of His agents; this theory had fascinated many of the Hellenist Jews to the extent of inventing in its support an endless variety of Angels, principalities, emanations, and even demons; but the theory tended to drag men down to the level of magic. Most thinkers preferred, however, to attribute to the Deity some personal activity in the control of mankind; this might be explained by identifying His activity with the forces of Nature, but only at the cost of degrading the conception of His powers; or else by the theory of an all-pervading, invisible essence, which in its turn led to those unhealthy forms of mystic delusion in which the one desire was for absorption into the Divine, with the loss of all sense of personal responsibility and effort. Such ideas, in all stages of crude expression, were in the air wherever Hellenism had penetrated; no intelligent boy could grow up in Galilee without being at least aware of the problem.

Now the crux of this problem is this—how to convey to the human mind a conception of the Divine Presence which will be worthy, adequate in so far as it goes, and not liable to the dangerous distortions which were so prevalent at the time. The Greeks had made brilliant attempts; they had explored every suggestion which their intellectual acumen could devise. Here the characteristic method of Jesus rises above their whole system of approach: He had a remarkable genius for seeing problems, not as conundrums of thought, but in relation to life. He began by arousing a sense of expectancy—the Kingdom of God was at hand; and parable after parable heightened the anticipation of the results of its coming. From this foundation He went on to picture God as a master who has left his home for a time and may return at any moment, without an instant's warning: "Be ye therefore *ready*"—this is the mental attitude which He inculcates so insistently. When once this habit of mind has been acquired, the whole realm of unhealthy speculation is swept aside, and the thought of God becomes an incentive to the highest level of effort, the most strenuous practice of the loftiest ideals: nothing can be too much to attempt for that all-seeing inspection of the life, its inner motives and aims, its concrete effects. When the mind has become keyed up to this attitude of life, there is an inevitable result: the mind realizes that this inspection is actually taking place at every moment, and thus grasps the idea of a Spiritual Presence, not as a matter of speculation, but as the living energy of a higher life which has already been experienced in some measure; this is the beauty of Christ's method, that its proofs are not

based on some strained effort of the reason in realms unknown and inconceivable, but on the actual facts of an inner experience, which can exultingly claim that "it is God Who worketh in you." At the thought of this intimate Presence, the conscience is stirred with just that anxiety which stimulates practical effort, while the dread of censure is lost in the sense of a full forgiveness and a wonderful, Divine appreciation of every sincere effort, however humble. By this method of approach, God is made known, not as the Absolute, but as the loving inspiration of a life quickened to strenuous effort: the approach is not intellectual, but vital; the result is not a mental conjecture, but Personality made known through the personality.

The method is so ingenious, so simple in its stages, so readily grasped by all who care to try, that we hardly realize how profoundly wise it is; the Presence of God is realized with a wholesome, inspiring power that sets the method of Christ supreme above all our philosophies. This is the one method by which man quits his baffling puzzles and rises to a veritable contact with the power which is at once the living energy of his own ideals and the object of his worship. Yet it has its dangers; we hear of the parent refusing to educate his son because the end of the world is coming almost immediately: here the method has been perverted because the parent has tried to grasp one point of the series without having learnt the preliminary stages, and has thus distorted and misinterpreted it.

We read that our Lord, after His Resurrection, frequently appeared to His Disciples; He might come at any moment: He was continuing His lessons in a way that would make the impression indelible. Finally, after His Ascension, when such appearances were no longer to be expected, there came to His pupils the fruit of this wonderful training—the Gift of the Spirit.

HAROLD CAVALIER.

THE EXODUS IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

IT is a remarkable fact that in the New Testament historical allusions are almost confined to the Hexateuch. Outside of it there are frequent allusions to David and Elijah, but those to David are chiefly genealogical or as psalmist. There are also single references to Samuel, Saul, Solomon, Queen of Sheba, Naaman, Elisha, Jezebel, Job, Jeremiah and Jonah, the majority on the lips of Christ.

In the Hexateuch the two great characters are naturally Abraham and Moses, but leaving aside references to Moses as lawgiver, like those to David as psalmist, we find what appears to be a disproportionate interest in the events of the Exodus which seems to imply a body of teaching connected with it in the early Church. These references are naturally specially marked in those parts which were addressed to Jewish readers and audiences, but the more scanty references in St. Paul shew him to have been aware of it.

Two great features of St. Stephen's speech in Acts vii. are, firstly, the repeated leadings out of the forefathers into new conditions; Abraham was led from Haran to Canaan, Joseph and Jacob from Canaan to Egypt, Moses first to Midian, then with his people to the wilderness; Joshua led them into Canaan, and finally in *v.* 43 comes the threat of exile to

Babylon, each step foretold and fulfilled; secondly, the triumph of their rejected leaders. The crux lies in *v.* 37, "Moses, which said unto the children of Israel, A prophet shall God raise up unto you from among your brethren, like unto me" (*cp.* Acts iii. 22), the leader of a new exodus, the giver of a new law, who, like Moses, had been rejected. The fault found with Stephen's teaching seems to have been that, whereas the older disciples were willing to remain within the fold of Judaism with its observances, he held that a new era had begun, and that Jesus of Nazareth should "change the customs which Moses delivered unto us" (Acts vi. 14). The Church of God was called to a new exodus, a new lawgiving, superseding the old, and should be on the march again.

This teaching was reinforced for the Church by the coincidence of the Crucifixion with the Passover and the giving of the Spirit with Pentecost, the festival of the giving of the Law. In the Gospels the Last Supper was marked by the giving of the "blood of the covenant" (in Luke xxii. 20 and 1 Cor. xi. 25 the *new* covenant), and in John xiii. 34 by the new commandment. In the Sermon on the Mount, Matthew shews the Master even then remodelling the Law with His "but I say unto you." The descriptions given of the death of Christ also are drawn from the imagery of the Exodus; St. Luke even speaks of the death as "His exodus" (ix. 31). He is "Christ our passover, sacrificed for us" (1 Cor. v. 6-8; *cp.* Jn. xix., which times His death at the killing of the lambs). His is the "blood of the new covenant," and in Hebrews He is the High Priest of an effectual Day of Atonement.

If we take this as a clue, it may explain the choice of some illustrations and fill out the statement in John v. 45, 46 (*cp.* Acts xxvi. 22) about the "witness of Moses." Indeed an almost complete parallel between the Church of the Exodus and that of the New Testament can be worked out, and if some of the suggested allusions seem far-fetched, their value as evidence must depend on the weight given to the background of thought assumed to lie behind them.

The Passover.—The actual death at Passovertide. Christ our Passover, sacrificed for us, who must therefore keep the feast with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth (1 Cor. v. 5-6). We are redeemed with the blood of a lamb without blemish (1 Pet. i. 18, 19; *cp.* Exod. xii. 5, 7, 13, 27). There may be an exodus allusion in "The blood of sprinkling" (Heb. xii. 24; 1 Pet. i. 2). The allusions to the Lamb "as it had been slain" in Rev. v. 6, etc., and "the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world," in John i. 29, 36, may at least include this sense as they sum up the sacrificial teaching of the Pentateuch which, those being the days before historical criticism, was envisaged on the background of Sinai.

The Exodus.—The whole of Hebrews is practically a call to a new and spiritual exodus, so that in speaking of Moses (xi. 26) he represents him as "accounting the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasures of Egypt.

The Red Sea.—Rev. xv. Those who had escaped the enemy of souls stand by the sea of glass and sing the song of Moses and the Lamb (Exod. xv. 1).

The Manna.—Exod. xvi. 4 *ff.* The bread from heaven and Christ the true bread from Heaven (John vi. 31-51).

The Water.—Exod. xvii. 6; 1 Cor. x. 4. "That Rock was Christ" (*cp.* John iv. 10; vii. 37; Rev. xxi. 6). Of the whole section on Israel in

the wilderness (1 Cor. x. 1-10) St. Paul says: "It all happened to them by way of warning to others" (Moffatt).

Moses.—He, says Heb. iii. 2-6, was a faithful servant, but Christ is worthy of more glory as being the son of the house. Moses foretold "a prophet like unto me" (Deut. xviii. 15, 19; Acts iii. 22; vii. 37, 52). And the Prophet coming was rejected as he had been. The veil on Moses' face hiding the transitory glory (Exod. xxxiv. 19-35) is contrasted with the veil not only "done away" in Christ, but the glory reflected by and transfiguring His followers (2 Cor. iii. 7-18).

The Covenant People.—Exod. xix. 5, 6. The promise that they should be a Kingdom of priests and a holy nation is claimed for the Church by 1 Pet. ii. 5, 9; Rev. i. 6; v. 10.

The Covenant.—Two Covenants are definitely contrasted by St. Paul in Gal. iv. 24-26. "Jerusalem that now is" under the old Sinai covenant is in bondage, but "the Jerusalem that is above is free, which is our mother." This is taken up again in Heb. xii. 18-24. The Christian is not come to the mount that could be touched, but to the new Jerusalem and to Jesus, the mediator of a new covenant.

This new covenant is shadowed forth in the giving of the new law on the mount in Matt. v.-vii. and still more in the new commandment of John xiii. 34. R.V. omits "new" covenant in the accounts of the inauguration of the Holy Communion in Matthew and Mark, but its inclusion in Luke and 1 Cor. shews that it was held so to be. Heb. viii. 6-13 argues that Christ is "the mediator of a better covenant," as described in Jer. xxxi. 31-34, by which is shewn the obsolescence of the old, and Heb. ix. 15-20 associates His death with the blood by which the new covenant was sealed (Exod. xxiv. 5-8).

The expression "blood of sprinkling" found in Heb. xii. 24, and in 1 Pet. i. 2 is the only reference to the way in which "the blood" is thought of as being used, and, like the expression "Lamb of God," seems to gather up into itself several allusions. In 1 Pet. the allusion to the Passover lamb in i. 19 may link it with the sprinkling of the doorposts (Exod. xii. 22); in Heb. ix. 19 the blood of the covenant is connected with the sprinkling at the covenant ceremony (Exod. xxiv. 6-8) and dedication of the tabernacle and goes on to the sprinkling in the Holy of Holies at the Day of Atonement, while in xii. 24 it is closely linked with the new covenant.

The New Priesthood.—The Pentateuch gives the account of the institution of the Aaronic priesthood (Heb. v. 4), but with the new covenant goes a new priesthood, and indeed the change of the law depends on the change of priesthood (Heb. vii. 12, 14). The new cloth is not to be patched on the old garment or the new wine put into the old bottles. Christ is the new High Priest after the order of Melchizedek (Heb. vii. 15-25), offering the one perfect sacrifice of atonement (Heb. ix. 24-28; x. 10), which shews the Levitical priesthood to have been only a parenthesis (Heb. x. 18; Gal. iii. 17-25). But Christians in virtue of the priesthood He has bestowed on them have the access to the Holy of Holies which was denied to the priesthood of the first covenant (Heb. x. 19-22).

The New Israel.—Christians then are the new Israel, still on the march; in a measure they are, even if foreigners, affiliated to the old. See Phil. iii. 3—"we are the circumcision"; Rom. ii. 29—"he is a Jew which is one inwardly"; iv. 16—Abraham is the father of all the faithful. And as the ordinances of the first Israel are a shadow of the true (Heb. viii. 5), so its experiences may be cited as a warning. "In these things they

become figures of us" (1 Cor. x. 6, R.V. margin). The conditions of the old covenant are applied to them—"Ye shall be holy for I am holy" (1 Pet. i. 16; Lev. xi. 44, etc.); and, if we think of the writer as having exodus symbolism in his mind, ii. 11—"as sojourners and pilgrims, to abstain from fleshly lusts, which war against the soul"—we have a glimpse of Israel attacked by Amalek and other adversaries. The numbering of the elect of the twelve tribes in Rev. vii. 4 may have allusion to the numbering of those who should enter on their inheritance in Num. xxvi.

The Tabernacle.—Such references as there are in Hebrews to the old place of worship concern the Tabernacle in the wilderness, the limitations of its ritual being a prophecy of further developments now accomplished (Heb. x. 8, 9; Exod. xxv. 8). Its New Testament counterpart is a Temple, but a temple of living stones. The congregation has become the House of God by the indwelling Spirit. The recollection of the days when Christ hailed Peter as the rock on which the Church was to be built, and described Himself as the stone rejected by the builders (Matt. xvi. 18; xxi. 42, 44; Acts iv. 11), gives ground for the "living stones" of which the "spiritual house" is to be built for the liturgy of the "royal priesthood" in 1 Pet. ii. 4-9, who offer spiritual sacrifices (1 Pet. ii. 5; Rom. xii. 1; Heb. xiii. 15). Christ, "whose house are we," says Heb. iii. 6. To St. Paul each saint is a "temple of the Holy Ghost" (1 Cor. vi. 19), but each "several building, fitly framed together, groweth into a holy temple in the Lord; in whom ye are also builded together for a habitation of God in the Spirit" (Eph. ii. 20-22), Christ being the foundation on which each builds (1 Cor. iii. 10-17). In Revelation the author sometimes sees the Temple, which is the "pattern" of the earthly (Heb. viii. 5; Rev. viii. 3, Exod. xl. 5; Rev. xi. 19; Exod. xl. 21; Rev. xv. 8; Exod. xl. 34; Rev. xxi. 3; Exod. xxv. 8; Lev. xxvi. 11; Rev. xxi. 23; Exod. xl. 24, 25); sometimes the living temple—"the Lord God Almighty, and the Lamb, are the temple thereof" (xxi. 22, *see also* Jn. ii. 19-21), of which the individual saint may be a pillar (iii. 12), while the cubic shape of the city (Rev. xxi. 16) is that of the Holy of Holies.

The Goal.—Heb. iv. 1-11 argues that though by Joshua the Lord had given rest (Josh. xxi. 44), Ps. xcv., written later, shewed, as did indeed all their history, that it was not a final rest. "There remaineth, therefore, a sabbath rest for the people of God" (iv. 9). That rest is both enjoyed (xii. 22, "we are come") and to come. The history of the Church of God has been one long anticipation from the days when the patriarchs dwelt in tents because "they looked for the city which hath the foundations," and the "better country" where "God hath prepared for them a city" (xi. 10, 16) through the long array of worthies who still received not the promise, waiting for us who still "have not here an abiding city, but we seek after the city which is to come" (xi. 39, 40; xiii. 14), the "inheritance" of 1 Pet. i. 4. That city the Revelation shews as the New Jerusalem (iii. 12; xxi.; xxii). To St. Paul it is "the Jerusalem that is above" (Gal. iv. 26). To the Philippian converts to whom Rome was more attractive than any Jerusalem, even if it were "new," he modifies it to "our citizenship is in heaven" (iii. 20), in which we are even now "fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household of God" (Eph. ii. 19).

But again the example of Israel is brought up. Many failed to enter upon their inheritance through unbelief. Let the Christian give diligence that he fall not after the same example of disobedience (Jude 5; Heb. iii.

12; iv. 11). It may mean that as Moses chose the wilderness rather than Egypt (Heb. xi. 25, 26), so the Christian must go forth unto Christ "without the camp, bearing his reproach" (xiii. 13). The Christian life is not one of quiescence, but a steady "walk" in the Way.

So while the Church compiled its Book of Testimonies from the Prophets and Psalms, it seems also to have worked out an apologetic, of which Hebrews is the most finished example, on the basis of Israel's early history shewing that the adventure of deliverance from the physical bondage of Egypt was only a shadow of the greater spiritual deliverance in Christ with its call to a higher spirit of adventure and constancy. Such a line of thought would naturally appeal most strongly to the Jewish converts in whose lives the recurring feasts made the Exodus still a living reality; it was not an artificial typology, as later, but the expression of a vivid experience, of which each Easter brought the double implication and each breaking of bread the commemoration. It also constituted a call to break with the old order and enter whole-heartedly upon the new. So, though St. Paul is aware of it, his largely Greek Churches would not have the same interest in Israel's ancient history, or the attachment to its traditions and ordinances, nor yet the sense of freedom in the escape from the yoke "which neither our fathers nor we were able to bear" as the audiences of the older apostles, and, except where Judaizers are in view, he uses it sparingly, or in a modified form. James has no mention of it. Possibly the Jerusalem Church did not wish to make an Exodus from the old order.

M. D. R. WILLINK.

QUERY ON GALATIANS v. 24

σὺν τοῖς παθήμασιν καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις.

A.V.: And they that are Christ's have crucified the flesh with the affections and lusts.

R.V.: with the passions and the lusts thereof.

Weymouth: with its passions and appetites.

Moffatt: with its emotions and passions.

Souter under *πάθημα* says "properly colourless, *an experience*: but most commonly an evil experience, evil treatment, suffering."

Abbott-Smith: (1) that which befalls one, a suffering, affliction; (2) a passive emotion, affection, passion.

Liddell and Scott has (1) suffering, misfortune; (2) a passive condition such as results from suffering, feeling, etc.

It has seemed to me that all the translations I quote (I have not access to any others) in a way narrow the sense of St. Paul's meaning by redundance: and that if *σὺν τοῖς παθήμασιν* were translated "with its sufferings," the meaning would be infinitely widened, infinitely more inspiring, giving a *double* goal instead of a single, and perhaps be nearer St. Paul's own meaning, who knew what it was to have to offer up physical suffering as well as all else. Abbott-Smith under his alternative translation [(2) a passive emotion, affection, passion] refers only to this verse and Rom. vii. 5 (*τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν*). I have wondered where he gets his justification from—just from the fact that A.V. and R.V. have translated "affections" and "passions"; or perhaps from a really

wider and recognized use of *πάθημα* in this sense? I have ventured to suggest this, as I feel that the altered translation, if sound, would come as a gift of inspiration with its so much richer content of meaning to very many—and every shade of further light in translation of Gospels and epistles is all part of His truth.

MAISIE SPENS.

NOTES ON PERIODICALS

Zeitschrift für die Alttestamentliche Wissenschaft. 1934. Heft 2.

J. BEGRICH very prettily carries Gunkel's thesis of oracles in the Psalms a stage further. The lamentation is common, but the actual divine reply has often disappeared. Thus in Ps. vi., verses 1-7 are the lamentation; between 7 and 8 Yahweh speaks through the priest; in *v.* 8 the worshipper rejoices: "The Lord hath heard the voice of my weeping." The actual oracles can in large manner be recovered from 2 Isaiah. Thus Ps. xxii. 1, "My God, why hast thou forsaken me?" is answered by Isa. liv. 7, "For a small moment have I forsaken thee; but with great mercies will I gather thee"; and Ps. xiii. 2, "How long wilt thou hide thy face from me?" by Isa. liv. 8, "In overflowing wrath I hid my face from thee for a moment; but with everlasting kindness will I have mercy on thee." The prophet of the Exile uses priestly material familiar to his compatriots. R. H. PFEIFFER makes an original contribution. The Egyptian doctrine that God created all nature as well as man antedates the Hebrew appearance of the belief by 1,000 years. As Amos discovered God's sway over all nations, Job taught His sway over nature; 2 Isaiah combined the two and became the first true Hebrew monotheist. C. KUHL studies the phraseology of Hos. i., ii. The pleading of ii. 2 is legal. In Assyrian marriage contracts the phrasing is, *e.g.*, "Kikkinu is her husband and Bitti-Dagan is his wife." The phrase in divorces is "Thou art not my wife," "Thou art not my husband." "Going naked" (*cf.* ii. 3, "lest I strip her naked") is a legal punishment. So: "Supposing his wife Bitti-Dagan says to her husband Kikkinu, 'Thou art not my husband,' she is to go out naked." J. JEREMIAS arranges the description of Ezekiel's Temple side by side with the data found in Hecatæus of Abdera (quoted in Josephus *c. Apion.* I. §§ 183-204) regarding Zerubbabel's Temple. They agree so nearly as to prove that the latter was designed on the pattern set by Ezekiel. P. JENSEN explains Ezra iv. 9 very attractively. "The Dinaites (judges), Apharsattchites (commissars), Tarpelites (couriers), Apharsites (Persians), Archevites (officials=Greek *ἀρχαί*), (officials of the) Babylonians, Susians *that is* Elamites (read *dhi*, 'that is,' for Dehaites), and the other nations."

W. K. L. C.

REVIEWS

THE WORLD AND GOD. The Scholastic Approach to Theism. By the Rev. Hubert S. Box, B.D., Ph.D., with a Preface by the Rev. M. C. D'Arcy, S.J., M.A. S.P.C.K. 7s. 6d.

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL. By the Rev. Hubert S. Box, B.D., Ph.D. The Faith Press. 2s. 6d.

The first book is an important contribution to the philosophy of Theism and well deserves the award of a doctorate in philosophy, for which degree it was submitted. Dr. Box gives us much more than a restatement of the Thomist arguments. What is here presented to us is a choice between Neo-Scholasticism on the one hand and on the other the many conflicting philosophies of recent times. The philosophy of the later Schoolmen could not claim acceptance from the modern mind. But Neo-Scholasticism may be in a more favourable position. Scholasticism, in the opinion of Dr. Box, soon departed from the position so well secured by the Angelic Doctor. The departures made were not advances towards fuller truth, but mistaken wanderings down side tracks which led nowhere. Neo-Scholasticism advances by recapturing the heights where the great master set the flag. This is especially true of the attitude of the Schoolmen towards science. "The Scholastics ought to have studied the progress of science and tried to adapt the new discoveries to the old philosophy. If St. Thomas had been living at that time he would undoubtedly have welcomed an alliance between the new science and the traditional metaphysics" (p. 30). So thinks Dr. Box. It is, however, open to question whether any alliance was possible, or ever will be possible, between science and the traditional metaphysics. The Schoolmen may have been wise in neglecting or opposing the discoveries of science, their first concern being to uphold the philosophy of Aquinas. Perchance St. Thomas himself would have repudiated the method by which these discoveries were made, since the method was not his. In this matter of method, Neo-Scholasticism appears to be in no better position to treat with modern science. Dr. Box is at pains to point out that the Scholastic arguments for the existence of God are *a posteriori* and not *a priori*, but the difference here is merely formal. Given two concepts A and B, shall we move from A to B or from B to A? The B of the Cosmological and Teleological Arguments is no less a logical abstraction than the A from which the Ontological Argument starts. None of these arguments, as propounded by rationalism, touches, at any

point, the actual data of experience. Between the rationalism of Plato, Aristotle and the Schoolmen on the one part, and on the other the empiricism of science from the time of Roger Bacon onwards, no alliance seems to be possible. If Theism stands or falls with rationalism then the apologist does well to remain aloof from any branch of science and to be especially suspicious of psychology.

The outstanding merit of this book is its very clear presentation of the case for Rational Theism. Dr. Box, having a logical mind of a high order and also the gift of lucid exposition, is eminently qualified for the task which he has here undertaken. It is high praise for a work on such a difficult and technical subject to say that throughout the whole book there is only one paragraph which is not readily understandable at the first reading. A paragraph on p. 65 remains obscure after several readings. While commending the book for its clarity, perhaps a word of praise for the printers may not be out of place. The only error detected is on p. 202, l. 15 down, where read "is" for "in."

Neo-Scholasticism is compared with many alternative systems of thought. Locke, Hume, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel are considered in turn and rejected, while modern writers such as William James, Professor Pringle-Pattison, Dr. Temple and Dr. Matthews also receive some severe criticism. The great pity is that Dr. Tennant's *Philosophical Theology* seems to have been neglected. But perhaps after all it is better so. There seems to be forced upon us as the great alternative either the position here expounded or the empiricism of Dr. Tennant. We may well be grateful to Dr. Box for presenting to us so sharply one horn of the dilemma.

Within the field of rationalism the argument here developed seems to be in its main contention unanswerable. The most that the rationalist critic can do is to quibble about minor points. Thus: A fourth section in Chapter X. on the distinction between Being and Existence would have been helpful. Again, on p. 202 and elsewhere, it is claimed that the complete absence of potentiality is fullness of activity, but is not this state perfect quiescence? Is activity possible without the effecting of change? Again, on p. 198, a false classification may be pointed out. A fish is not an animal. Perhaps a whale is the creature in mind; if so, it is an animal and not a fish. The contention illustrated by this fish also seems to be logically invalid. The fallacy of four terms lies hidden here. Under the term "mode" there lurks an undetected distinction. A difference in degree must be distinguished from a difference in kind. The difference between perfection in physical goodness and perfection in moral

goodness is surely a difference in kind and not merely in degree. Moral goodness could never be reached by increase in physical goodness. Such slips in argument are as few as they are trivial; but with such, the rationalist critic has to be content. On his own ground Dr. Box is a match for all comers.

The critic who believes that in the face of modern science any effective apologetic for Theism must be based upon empiricism is placed in an awkward position. He can only deal adequately and fairly with such a book as this by writing another book to answer it. Mr. G. K. Chesterton has confessed that he writes a book on the slightest provocation. Here is almost unendurable provocation and sufficient excuse for a lengthy volume in self-defence. And that is saying much for the work of Dr. Box. Those whose philosophy is poles apart from Scholasticism may be urged to read this book. Those who accept rationalism will also be grateful for this contribution to their philosophic storehouse. Dr. Box thinks that "many thinkers are directing their glances towards Scholasticism and are wondering whether a return to St. Thomas Aquinas is not what is needed to-day." If this be so, then the book is assured of the excellent sale which it fully deserves.

It would be inexcusable to profess disagreement with the philosophy defended in this book and not indicate at all the kind of objection that seems to be relevant. Fundamentally, the issue is between Deductive Logic and Scientific Method, and of course, the clash is sharpest in the chapter on Causality. "The principle of causality is self-evident," says Dr. Box, and continues, "Its truth appears directly the subject and the predicate are understood" (p. 119). This is utterly false. Science does not deal with either subject or predicate, but examines experimentally actual and particular things in order to discover if possible uniform correlations. On the further question whether these correlations are causal or not, modern science usually shrinks from dogmatizing. But even the correlation is only discovered experimentally and never deductively from the understanding of concepts.

Empiricism includes scientific method and uses that method extensively, but fortunately it is not confined to one method. Experience is wider than intellectual apprehension. When the knowledge to be gained lies in the field of personal relations, then nothing less than a full personal experience is an adequate foundation. Knowledge of God cannot be reached by reason alone. What is reached by reason is not a Personal God, but an impersonal abstraction. Rationalism is not dealing with God, but with a name only. Thus to say of God, "He is related to creatures only logically," and again, "On the side of the

creature the relation is real; on the side of the Creator it is merely logical," may be correct Scholasticism, but the object of this ratiocination is not the God of any religion, but merely a logical concept. There is ground for the hope that what is logically correct is actually false.

The frequent use of geometrical illustrations is not accidental. Pure reason is most at home in the sphere of pure abstraction. In point of fact, however, the elaborate equations so exactly analyzed turn out at last to be nothing more than skilfully disguised identities. Wherefore no real knowledge has been gained although the labour has been so great. The unpleasant critic who doubted the existence of Mrs. Harris is on occasions deserving of emulation. A critic may, therefore, be forgiven when he speaks disrespectfully of the triangle and declares, "It's my belief that there aint no sich thing." A triangle of wood or metal or paper is real, but the triangle in the rationalist's mind is a pure abstraction and, except as a thought, has no existence. Dr. Box suggests, on the contrary, that what exists in mind only is more perfect than when it exists in material form (p. 196). But the very name "Geometry" should remind us that the idea of the triangle was abstracted from measurements of land. Pure reason, however, works more congenially amongst pure abstractions and too often forgets that it is dealing with unrealities. There is no warrant for the inference that what is demonstrably true of abstractions is true also of realities. Dr. Box, however, affirms, "The truth is that the treatment of metaphysical matters is to a very large extent independent of a knowledge of physical science." In answer to this the empiricist would contend that in so far as metaphysics is independent of physical science it is dealing with abstractions which have no existence except as thought. In the age-long conflict between nominalism and realism, it is nominalism that has steadily gained ground and now at last is assured of victory.

One other point must suffice. In the rationalist's universe there is no room for chance, accident, and hazard. All is according to law, there is no spontaneity, and no event occurs which is incalculable and unpredictable. This is not the universe of modern science. Similarly, in the moral and spiritual realm there is no opportunity for real adventure and no scope for the creation of new values. Reality will be no richer in any respect after this universe has ceased to be. All the suffering endured and all the heroism achieved will count for nothing in the end. From the standpoint of the ultimate, all will be as if we had never been. Reality will have gained no increment of worth because man came into existence at the fiat

of the divine. And in like manner, in the sphere of philosophy and religion, there is no room for probability, but only for certainty. "The Scholastics claim to provide for the deep craving for certitude," says Dr. Box, and a moment later adds, "Religion must have absolute certainty" (p. 34). Now, if this be so, then faith is nothing better than assent to what it declared on authority. Without chance there can be no real morality, and with certainty there can be no real faith. Mere intellectual assent is very different from the "faith-mysticism" of St. Paul. Faith is a personal response of the whole self to God, a great adventure lived on the chance that love is at the heart of all truth. A risk that enthrals our whole being is preferable to an intellectual certainty. Trotter, in *The Instincts of the Herd in Peace and in War*," says some harsh things about the craving for certitude, and other psychologists have not contradicted what he says. When religion demands a genuine faith it does better than when it offers a spurious certitude.

The second book presents very clearly the intellectual problem that needs to be solved, and proceeds to state quite fairly some of the solutions that have been offered by modern philosophy. The optimism of Leibniz is considered first and afterwards the pessimism of Schopenhauer and von Hartmann. Quotation is used rather freely considering that the space is so limited, but it must be acknowledged that the quotations are invariably well chosen. So much space has been used for quotation, however, that the criticisms offered by Dr. Box are of necessity somewhat scrappy. This is a pity, all the more so because Dr. Box has an eminently logical mind. Indeed, the strongest objection that can be brought against the book is on the score of its pure rationality. To Dr. Box, evil seems to present itself chiefly as an exercise for the intellect; it does not seem to emerge out of the experience of the soul. It is strange, for instance, that although the book ends with Theism, it is a purely speculative Theism, and no reference to the Cross is made, or, apparently, felt to be relevant.

The bias towards intellectualism is early disclosed. Dr. Box quotes, it is to be supposed with approval, Sir Henry Jones in *A Faith that Enquires* to the effect that "the moral life is the best thing conceivable, and that this present world, owing in a way to its imperfections, furnishes the opportunities for the moral process, and demands it as the ultimate good." A couple of pages later, in summing up the matter, Dr. Box says, "We know that in creating the universe God's aim was the testing, training, and perfecting of rational beings"—rational, notice, not moral.

The same bias prevents Dr. Box from appreciating the emotional element in the problem. Schopenhauer and van Hartmann, with all their shortcomings, were well aware of the emotions. Their solution is closely akin to the religious teaching of India, especially in the treatment of desire.

The solution to the problem offered by Dr. Box himself is frankly a return to the Scholastic philosophy. The coldly intellectual treatment of evil allows Dr. Box to contemplate with equanimity the fulfilment of the psalmist's hope "The wicked shall be turned into hell." The persistent sinner ceases to be an end in himself and is used by God as a means to the good of others. The abhorrence with which Kant would regard such a doctrine is surely justified. And hardly more acceptable is the dogmatic assertion that the righteous man receives "the fruit of his labours." Surely Eternal Life is the gift of God, a gift freely given, not a payment of what has been earned and won by man.

Many will feel at the conclusion that the argument has been so closely knit that "the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the Love of God, and the Fellowship of the Holy Spirit" fail to break through the meshes of such taut and narrow intellectualism. Nevertheless, the reader will be compelled to acknowledge with gratitude that the task attempted by Dr. Box has been well done within the limits which, apparently, are imposed by fidelity to Scholasticism. In convincing us that Scholasticism is not enough, Dr. Box has rendered good service.

CYRIL H. VALENTINE.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE BOOKS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT. By W. O. E. Oesterley, D.D., Litt.D., and Theodore H. Robinson, D.D., Litt.D. S.P.C.K. 10s. 6d.

Our first feeling on noting the appearance of this book was one of amazement. We read with delight the work of these collaborating authors on Hebrew Religion. A few years later it was our privilege to read and review a work by them on *The History of Israel*, covering the whole field of knowledge on the subject—a book whose very appearance was a literary phenomenon, and which must become the standard book on the subject—as charming as it is learned. Now, one would have said, surely these learned authors, this *par nobile fratrum*, who had successfully accomplished so mighty an undertaking, would need a rest. Nature, one would have thought, seemed to demand it. On the contrary, however, they now present us

with "the third work in which we have joined in happy collaboration" (preface). This book coming after so short an interval is the more surprising because it is extremely technical and full of references, giving evidence on every page of intense labour. *The History of Israel* might be regarded as a popular book suitable for any educated reader. The work now before us is rather a scholar's book written for students. We could hardly advise any one to enter on its study who had not some knowledge of Hebrew. But for the serious student it is an education in itself to be able to refer on every difficult or disputed point to this complete and satisfactory guide. We have often consulted with advantage, besides the great book of Driver, such helps as Cornill, Steuernagel, Sellin, and the like, but now we shall not need them, we have our own book in English, up to date, by scholars of acknowledged authority. We are thankful that the students of the future should have such a book to guide their studies and refer to in their difficulties.

Before we begin our examination of this work we cannot refrain from calling attention to a really startling feature in it. It is written in collaboration, *and the authors always agree in their opinions.* Only in one place a difference of opinion is recorded (p. 72). It is extraordinary that in a book which we may say has a controversy behind every page we find our authors always of the same opinion on every question, and it certainly gives more than double weight to every conclusion expressed that it is the considered opinion of two such scholars.

It is impossible to *review* a book of this kind; one might as well try to review a lexicon. All we can hope to do is to give the reader some idea of its scope and purpose, and to discuss in more detail some of the topics which have specially interested us in reading it. We note that no information is given us as to which of the authors actually wrote any portion of the book, but we think that readers who have a *penchant* for "higher criticism" will in many cases be able to arrive at correct conclusions on this matter.

The book may be regarded as a companion to the Old Testament, supplying the student with guidance and information on a very large number of topics which must meet him on his way. Considering the moderate size of this work, it is astonishing how much information is packed into it. Recent views of all kinds receive full attention, and one feels that all this material has been reduced into shape, not only by fine scholarship, but by intense personal labour. The headings will reveal the contents of the book and its comprehensive scheme: The Canon of the O.T., The Text of the O.T., The Pentateuch (which includes Deuteronomy)—three very fine essays which occupy 46 pages and

cover especially Analysis of Sources and Dating. Then follow Joshua, Judges, and Ruth. Then come dissertations on 1 and 2 Samuel (8 pages), 1 and 2 Kings (16 pages), and a very full discussion on 1 and 2 Chronicles, followed as they ought to be by Ezra, Nehemiah (the whole being 22 pages), and Esther. Then we proceed to the Poetical literature with an essay on the forms of Hebrew poetry, about which we hope to say something later on, and a delightful essay of 16 pages on the Wisdom literature, followed appropriately by a sympathetic section on Job and the solution of its problems (11 pages). The sections on Psalms, Proverbs, and Ecclesiastes are each in its own way excellent and very inviting. On the other hand, we are not satisfied with the treatment of the Song of Songs. The Prophetic literature is prefaced by a learned and lucid introduction of 11 pages. This brings us to what in our opinion is the finest section of the book—the great essay on Isaiah, Deut.-Isaiah, and Trito-Isaiah (55 pages), where learning, insight and sustained industry are visible on every page. The essay on Jeremiah which follows is of very great interest, and a feature of very special value is the discussion (pp. 307-9) on the relation between Jeremiah and Deuteronomy, which we hope to touch on later. After Samuel we have an excellent essay on the thorny subject of Ezekiel dealing in some detail with recent controversies, and finally essays on Daniel and on the Twelve Minor Prophets. All these are good, and we would specially name the interesting treatment of Jonah. These essays deal with every subject of interest connected with the books they are treating, such as text, structure, contents, date, LXX, and similar topics. Here as a specimen is the analysis of the section on Psalms (p. 179 *f.*):

"Place in the Canon. General Title. The Titles of Individual Psalms: (1) Titles containing musical directions; (2) titles containing the names of popular melodies; (3) some other terms occurring in titles. Collections embodied in the Psalter. The Dates of the Psalms. Types of Psalms. The Psalms as Liturgical Documents. The Psalms part of a World Literature. The Hebrew Text (in Psalms) of the LXX."

The mere enumeration of these topics is enough to shew that the student will find in regard to any book just the information he wants. He will also find in the judicial appraisement of various theories, and the judgments of two such scholars upon them, not only a good deal of delight, but a source of instruction as to the way in which such critical enquiries ought to be conducted.

We sincerely recommend this book to every serious student of the O.T.

Having, as we venture to claim, given our readers an account of the contents and structure of this work, and expressed our opinion of its high value, our task might seem to be accomplished. We shall, however, use the space available to us to make some observations upon a few points which have interested us as we examined its pages. Chief among these is *metre*. For a long period students have been annoyed (we know that *we* have), in using commentaries, by constant emendations *metri causa* without an explicit statement of the metrical rule to which these emendations were supposed to conform, and although not so stated it seemed always to be the underlying assumption that Hebrew poets only wrote in fixed and not in varying metres. Hence the frequent alterations of the text to fit it to the supposed fixed metre. Our authors take a much wider view with which we find ourselves largely in sympathy. "The alternation of 3:2 and 2:2 is so common as to make it practically certain that it was regularly admissible. Similarly the appearance of 2:2:2 and 3:3:3 in poems otherwise 3:3 does not in itself constitute irregularity" (p. 146). The authors seem to have some hesitation in applying this principle to *Qinah* poems, but in fact every extant Qinah has some such variations (see, *e.g.*, the little Qinah, Amos v. 2), and in this class of poems also there is no obligation to amend them *merely* to mould them to a cast-iron prosody without any other ground. We are really grateful to our authors for putting this important matter on a sound basis, and we hope it will soon find its way into the commentaries.

We should have been glad if our authors had devoted a few words to the opinion that Isa. lx.-lxii. was not part of Trito-Isaiah, but a detached piece of Deut.-Isaiah in some way separated from this book and found and preserved by Trito-Isaiah (Cannon, *Z.A.W.*, 1929, p. 284; *ibid.*, 1934, p. 75. Oesterley, *History of Israel*, II., 104-5. Proksch in a private letter). It is not necessary to repeat what we have already said on previous occasions. Style, contents, point of view, hopes, all seem to us to point the same way. We think the point worthy of the authors' reconsideration, and trust that in future editions it may receive attention.

Some interesting points arise on Deuteronomy. We have read so many critical theories that we did not think we were capable of being surprised by any. But we must confess to being a little startled at the suggestion that the code in Deut. xii.-xxvi., xxviii., was invented and slipped into the temple at Jerusalem by the priests of Bethel (pp. 60, 66, etc.). We have no space for a full discussion of this matter. We can only point to a few plain facts. The priesthood of Bethel entirely

rejected the message of Amos, and drove him out of the country. Israel, after Hosea, never produced a prophet of righteousness like Isaiah or Micah. The Jeroboam bull worship went on to the end, and it was owing to the newly found book that Josiah destroyed the old sanctuary at Bethel (2 Kings xxiii. 15). We find it beyond our power to believe that there were actually or potentially spiritual forces in Bethel equal to producing this book and palming it off on the Jewish priests, the King and the prophetess. The discovery of the book in the temple remains a mystery, but we cannot doubt that there were circles in Jerusalem who knew of its existence. Perhaps Hilkiah was not quite so surprised as our authors suggest (p. 58), and we find this view easier to hold than the theory of a group from Bethel creeping into the temple, hiding the book (and such a book) amid the ruins and disappearing into oblivion.

We would commend to every reader the very informing section on Jeremiah and the Reforms of Josiah (p. 307 *f.*). There is an undoubted difficulty here owing to the utterance of the prophet about the law: "the lying pen of the scribes has made it into a lie" (Jer. viii. 8). The explanation given by our authors is luminous and satisfactory: (*a*) Jeremiah, like every thoughtful man, did not hold the same opinions unchanged at all periods of his life; (*b*) the results of the Deuteronomic reforms were often unsatisfactory and disappointing. The whole argument is an excellent example of the sound methods of our authors in dealing with a difficult subject.

There are other points which we might have liked to discuss had space permitted, but these are only details. We may close by expressing our opinion that the book will have a strong and healthy influence on O.T. studies in England. It must form part of the working library of every earnest student of the subject. We wish it all success.

W. W. CANNON.

NOTICES

THE ŚAIVA SCHOOL OF HINDUISM. By S. Shivapadasundaram, B.A. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 6s.

The author of this book has come under the spell of the word "scientific." He does not define the word, but he is quite sure that if he can demonstrate that Śaivaism is a "scientific" religion, he will be able to commend it to Western thinkers.

By "scientific" he apparently means "philosophically reasonable," forgetting that when scientists philosophize, whether reasonably or not, they are straying outside their proper sphere.

He argues scientifically thus:

"The essence of all living beings is the soul. . . . Some attribute to the soul knowledge, desire, and energy, which are ever changing. Some postulate a free will in addition to them. The soul so understood is an indefinite and complex conception, and cannot therefore receive scientific treatment. The right course is to use the word to denote the essence of a living being divested of all its adjuncts. It then becomes a simple thing that cannot be analyzed any further."

And again. Speaking of the Incarnation, the author writes: "The incarnation of God is an illustration of this false reasoning. Birth and sufferings after birth are limitations, and it is therefore as impossible for God to be born as man as it is for a circle to become a square."

Such a book is difficult to appraise. Probably if the author wrote of Śaivaism in language that would appeal to Eastern readers, instead of trying to be highly and attractively Western, we should be completely mystified. Personally, I am inclined to think that the first few chapters, with their reflections on religion is general, are valueless except for the light that they throw on the mentality of the Westernized Hindu.

There is much, however, that is valuable in the chapters on Śaiva doctrine, psychology and devotional practice. The account of the Spiritual Exercises suitable to different stages of "the Path" is clear and good. The author does not mention Śaiva popular cults and superstitions. But, after all, why should he? They are not "scientific."

ÆLFRIDA TILLYARD.

PLOUGHED UNDER. By Amy Carmichael. S.P.C.K. 2s. 6d.

There must be at least three hundred million people in India waiting to be converted to Christianity. Statisticians could probably do something towards making us grasp how many three hundred million really is. They could tell us how long it would take if all this vast crowd were to walk past us slowly in single file, or how far they would stretch if they stood side by side from Charing Cross northwards, or something of the kind.

And what is one soul among these millions? What fractional, infinitesimal value can it possibly have?

This remarkable little book makes us understand and enter into the passionate love for one single soul which animates the true missionary as it animated the Saviour of us all. Amy Carmichael has written the story of one little Indian girl, "Star," who, as a child, had prayed all by herself for a "living God" other than the dead Siva whose ashes she rubbed on her forehead daily.

The missionaries had come, on a day of blazing heat, to the town of Uncrowned King, having prayed, "Lord, send us to souls prepared"; and there, silent and unnoticed among the curious who gathered to stare at the strangers, was this child, not yet twelve years old, hearing and understanding the Gospel of the Living God.

It is in many ways a painful book to read, for little Star had to go through so many trials. The incident of the pariah dog who defended her chastity is not easily forgotten, nor are some of the accounts of the malice and cruelty of men. Through all the girl's sufferings, the mission-

ary suffers with her—this one child, this one soul, precious and beloved, desired of God Himself!

Are you ever faintly bored by missions? You will not be when you have read "Ploughed Under."

ÆLFRIDA TILLYARD.

JESUS CHRIST, HIS PERSON, HIS MESSAGE AND HIS CREDENTIALS. By Léonce de Grandmaison. Volume III. Translated from the French. Sheed and Ward. 15s.

This is the third and last volume of Father de Grandmaison's weighty consideration of the historical and critical investigation of the New Testament of the last forty years. There is no need to say that it is everywhere marked by a careful and courteous study and use of the most diverse Catholic and Protestant scholars—a study and use which provoke admiration both for the extent of the author's reading and for his readiness to learn wherever there is sincere and single striving after truth. Nor should it be necessary to remind those who have read the earlier volumes that, however critical and liberal their training may have been, they should find it possible to follow the argument of this book with sympathy, so loth is the author to offend by resort to prejudiced or "authorized" conclusions. It is the work of a real student, and as such is to be commended to all who feel bound to study the New Testament Scriptures.

Like its predecessors, this volume contains two books: "The Works of Christ" and "The Religion of Jesus Christ." The former, comprising about two-thirds of the volume, begins by defining Christian Miracle and Christian Prophecy, goes on to consider Jesus as Prophet and the miracles which He wrought, and so approaches the vital problem of the Resurrection of Jesus. Jesus as Prophet does much more than speak in God's name, much more than foresee what is coming to pass. He declares the Word of God, which glorifies the Son of Man, not only in the Resurrection, not only in the great tribulation of Jerusalem and the triumphant preaching to the Gentiles, but in the consummation of the present era and the summoning of the entire human race, without distinction of faith, before His judgment-seat. He works miracles which defy explanation as quickened natural processes, or as the romantic exaggeration of popular fables, being "tokens of higher, spiritual, eternal realities, works of light and goodness," yet "none the less works of power" which, "as such, inaugurate the Kingdom of God, whose vital representations they are." So the Resurrection cannot be isolated from the prophecy and miracles of Jesus, but must be considered with them, being the crown of His works, "the sublime completion of a ministry that everything shows to be more than human." Neither can it be regarded merely as the symbol of Christian religious experience, since it is the pledge of its reality, "the assurance given by God to those who undertake (Christianity) that they will not have laboured in vain and that their life is worth living."

The second part of this volume, "The Religion of Jesus Christ," makes a careful study of the arguments for seeing its origin in the Mystery Religions of the Hellenistic Age, discovers it instead as coming into being, under the influence of God, as an articulate form of worship in which the

commemoration of the Lord, the prayer in common, and the breaking of the bread were the vital elements, while still nourished in the cradle of Judaism. St. Paul lies wholly within the development of this essential religion, as also do the writers at the end of the Apostolic Generation. For all His worshippers, from the beginning to the present day, Jesus is not "a master of the past, a mere character in history. He is alive. . . . By baptism, by the Eucharist, by sanctifying grace, but also by an interior intercourse based on faith and maintained by prayer—the mystical experience is but the same thing, in an intense and extraordinarily satisfying form—Jesus remains in the midst of his own. . . . He still demands the unique love he claimed during his life—and is still given it."

Such is the broad line of the argument. In form, however, it is conditioned by the attacks launched by liberalism upon the Catholic Faith. Accordingly, although it contains many illuminating and constructive passages, it inevitably ranks as apologetic rather than as exegesis. Already it has the appearance of belonging to a period. Some of it now seems like flogging a dead horse, while at other points it seems as though the author has stopped short where, as the present era is teaching us, he might well have said much more. However, this is the inevitable lot of defensive apologetic, and it is to be hoped that it will not prevent this work being made use of, as the mine of information and monument of co-ordination that it is, for many years to come.

This notice would be incomplete without mention of the many scholarly detached notes and the three indexes to the whole work which it contains.

NOEL DAVEY.

THE WILFRID WARDS AND THE TRANSITION. Vol. I.: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. By Maisie Ward. Sheed and Ward. 15s.

Wilfrid Ward's title to fame is that not of an original thinker but of a very great biographer. His greatness lay not only in the faithfulness and candour of his portraiture, but also in his ability to fill in the historical background of his subject. Thus the biographies of his father, W. G. Ward, of Cardinal Wiseman, and of Cardinal Newman, constitute a comprehensive history of the Catholic revival in England during the nineteenth century, chiefly, of course, of the revival in the Roman Church, but also of its relation to the parallel revival in the Church of England. They provide an indispensable account of the growth of modern ultramontanism. Wilfrid Ward himself was a follower neither of the extreme ultramontanes nor of the liberal Catholics, but, once he was emancipated from the circumstances of his upbringing, he became and remained a devoted disciple of Newman.

The present volume, which is to be followed by another this year, is an attempt to continue the story from where Wilfrid Ward left it. This, too, while primarily biographical, supplies a wide historical context. It supplies, in fact, a panoramic view of the later Victorian religious world in its intellectual aspect. For the Wilfrid Wards moved largely and deliberately in non-Roman Catholic circles. Wilfrid's vocation is represented as being that of a liaison officer between Catholicism and unbelief. "The essence of his talent was an overmastering interest in the workings of other men's minds" (p. 98). Among those whom he knew more or less intimately were Tennyson, Jowett, Huxley and Sidgwick,

and much of the interest of these pages lies in what is said about these and other eminent Victorians. Wilfrid Ward's own reminiscences, which he left in an unfinished state, are successfully interwoven with his daughter's narrative and, of course, with letters.

A curious light is thrown on the manner of life of "Ideal" Ward's household with its mixture of puritanism, hot-house piety, and what would commonly be called "spikery" (see p. 27 *ff.*). "It was assumed, as a matter of course, that when we grew up the boys of the family would be priests and the girls nuns." And when Wilfrid proved reluctant to follow this predetermined course, his father's lack of sympathy and understanding provides a revealing commentary on the dangers of ecclesiasticism and extreme other-worldliness. It was his life-long regret that he was not allowed to go up to Oxford, and he played a leading part in securing the change of policy by which Roman Catholics were permitted to seek admission to the universities. In this, as in other matters, he was faithful to the mind of Newman.

Mrs. Wilfrid Ward, who was a daughter of James Hope-Scott, another of the Oxford converts, shared her husband's interests and outlook. Her novels may be regarded as a Catholic counterpart to those of Mrs. Humphry Ward, and certainly as not inferior in merit.

A. R. VIDLER, O.G.S.

ISAAC NEWTON. A Biography. By Louis Trenchard More. Scribner's. 18s.

Dr. L. T. More, who is Professor of Physics and Dean of the Divinity School in the University of Cincinnati—and also, some of our readers may like to know, brother of Paul Elmer More, the distinguished Christian Humanist of Princeton—has produced an important biography. It is likely, in fact, for long to continue the standard one. Not since 1855, when David Brewster published his two-volume *Life*, has a work on Newton approaching the dimensions of the present work been issued; and Dr. More has been able, through an extended investigation of primary sources, to point to a number of errors both in fact and in judgment in Brewster's volumes. Being a competent physicist, the author is able to move with sureness in the field of Newton's activities, which naturally calls for the fullest treatment. He has excluded, however, nearly all scientific technicalities, and thus the untrained physicist will find the volume for the most part quite easy to read. The biography would perhaps have been improved if it had been somewhat curtailed. No extended account of Galileo's discovery of the telescope or of the history of the atomistic hypothesis was really necessary in a Life of Newton.

We cannot here even outline the story of Newton's life. That he succeeded the eminent Isaac Barrow in the Lucasian chair at Cambridge in 1669 at his predecessor's own wish, that he discovered the divergent refractive indices of different coloured lights, that he was the first scientist to construct a reflecting telescope, that he claimed to have invented the infinitesimal calculus (and had a fierce controversy with Leibniz on the justice of this claim), that he took a leading part in the reform of the coinage early in the eighteenth century, above all that he set forth the Law of Gravitation in his *Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica*—these are facts known to all the world. We must confine ourselves here

to a few observations on his speculations in matters of religion. There is the more reason for doing this, in that it is in this field especially that Dr. More is able to offer us much original matter.

"Newton," writes Dr. More, summing up his subject's attitude to theology, "did not turn to religion as a solace from discouragement or from fear, but cultivated it steadily because he believed it to be the noblest occupation of the mind. His estimate of the comparative values of science and religion is best shown by the fact that he considered his *Principia* and *Optics* to be useful, since they had helped to make manifest the laws of God, and had revealed His nature" (p. 611 *f.*). He had a deep interest in the two allied subjects of Biblical Chronology and Apocalyptic expectations. Following Archbishop Ussher, he accepted the year 4004 B.C. as the date of the Creation. In the little horn of the fourth beast of the Book of Daniel he saw the Church of Rome foretold.

What is less generally known, however—and, indeed, only through the original material which Dr. More here presents does the fact receive full emphasis—is that Newton was a convinced Socinian in his doctrine of the Trinity. It was primarily for this reason that he made his extended investigations into the text of 1 John v. 7 and 1 Tim. iii. 16. In two papers which Dr. More is able to draw upon—he believes that hitherto these papers have been consciously suppressed—Newton drew up fourteen *Argumenta—i.e.*, Scriptural passages—against the doctrine, and seven *Rationes—i.e.*, considered reasons—against it. The majority of these "objections" incidentally are quite commonplace, and all had been in principle raised and more than adequately replied to by the great theologians of the fourth century. It may perhaps be worth suggesting, however, that Newton was led to his "subordinationism" through his atomistic view of the structure of Reality, with its corresponding sacrifice of "internal" to "external" relationship; his conception of the Godhead would thus tend to be Origenistic rather than Antiochene—that is, in Loof's phraseology, "Pluralistic Monophysite."

Unhappily, Dr. More's capacity as a theologian is not equal to his competence as a scientist. This is betrayed, *e.g.*, by his using the word "consubstantiation" (where "consubstantiality" is meant) in reference to Trinitarian doctrine—a use for which there is no countenance in the *N.E.D.* His somewhat scornful treatment of the Orthodox doctrine of the Trinity is thus hardly justified on the part of one to whom it is clearly not very familiar. On page 645 the author tells us that the "doctrines [of the Church of England] are not in conformity with rigorous laws of mechanics." We are unable to discover either what this assertion means or what is the authority for it. Just before he had also stated that in Newton's system "God and man had but a minor rôle in comparison with Nature." When he wrote this, Dr. More had surely forgotten the great passage at the end of the *Principia*.

F. L. Cross.

The Mystical Doctrine of St. John of the Cross. An abridgment made by C. H. with an introduction by R. H. J. Steuart, S.J. Sheed and Ward. 5s.

World Intangible. By R. H. J. Steuart, S.J. Longmans, Green. 5s.

The reader who knew nothing of Fr. Steuart but that he was the author of *World Intangible* would still be strongly impressed by seeing that he had sponsored this abridgment of St. John of the Cross. Nevertheless, it

must be doubted whether even Fr. Steuart's support will avail to give the book a wide usefulness in this country. Englishmen are not, as a rule, disposed to take kindly to the "Pages Choisies de . . ." "Les plus belles pages de . . .," and "Saint . . . , ce qu'il faut connaître de ses œuvres," the satellites or parasites which attend every reputable name in a French catalogue. Nor is this prejudice merely intellectual snobbery. And surely, with St. John of the Cross at least, "ce qu'il faut connaître de ses œuvres" is all—or nothing. The very fact that Professor Allison Peers is at present engaged on a new translation, from the definitive Spanish edition, which is to supersede that of David Lewis and Dom Benedict Zimmerman (which this volume follows in the main), goes to shew that those who care at all to know what St. John wrote care enough to insist on having his *ipsissima verba*. However faithfully this selection and arrangement of his words may represent his mind, the reader who is unfamiliar with the complete works has to take the compiler's word for it, and the task of resolving any doubts which may arise is made the more difficult for him by the fact that no references are given! There are plenty of cross-headings, and the print and binding is of the standard we have learned to expect from Messrs. Sheed and Ward.

Fr. Steuart's own book, too, is unlikely to have a very wide usefulness. But where it is appreciated, it will be appreciated very highly indeed. It is a book difficult to catalogue, even as to its form: essays? meditations? —on the whole, "musings" seems best to describe its manner. And its matter? The philosophical and theological presuppositions of the *Spiritual Exercises*. Yet that description might equally well cover Fr. Rickaby's *Waters that go Softly*; and the two books are as different as chalk from cheese. In the interval the Thomistic revival has become an established fact, and the controversy anent *Contemplation for All* has proved more fruitful than most discussions on that apparently remote speculative plane. These are perhaps the chief non-personal factors which account for the difference; the chief of the personal ones is this: Fr. Rickaby had an astonishing gift for making fundamental and commonplace truths vivid; Fr. Steuart has a gift, equally astonishing and delightful, for making plain truths equally fundamental, but obscure. He can be subtle, but is never involved.

Two short quotations will provide a sufficient sample of his manner: the first from a chapter entitled "Instant in Prayer" (p. 38). "Now, in the valid prayer of petition is always implied acceptance of whatever the answer may be: in adoration, similarly, in praise, in thanksgiving, and in contrition, the motif (variously rendered) is always recognition of the Supreme Will, submission to it, acquiescence in it, desire to bring one's own will into harmony with it. Any act, therefore, which in its first intention means that we deliberately place our wills in line with God's, that we wish thereby to bring about adhesion of them to His, is prayer, real prayer in its most fundamental significance, for it contains that essence of true prayer which must underlie all its forms.

"To see, then, the whole of our legitimate activities as primarily the occasions of this submission and adhesion, is to make of them prayer as real and definite as any verbal or mental phrasing could be. To do what we do cheerfully and willingly, having more and more as our real and concrete motive for this the simple desire that we may thereby do God's Will (whatever other good motives there may be too), is always literally to pray, and it is to pray literally always."

With this it is interesting to compare the teaching of the late Father Léonce de Grandmaison on "L'Oraison virtuelle" in the recently published first volume of his *Écrits Spirituels*.

The later passage is from the first of two chapters headed "In Spirit and in Truth" (p. 50). "To place ourselves, then, in the presence of God and to keep ourselves there waiting upon His will, whatever that may be: not producing acts of reflection, or desires, whatever be our inclination, but, should they arise, passing them by as not germane to this particular occasion, however much we may need them at another time: not expecting 'lights' or 'consolations' nor wanting them, for we should know that these will divert the current of our attention from Him to ourselves: not fearing or being discouraged by distractions, for though we cannot help their coming we do not want them to come; but all the while quietly, without haste or anxiety or ambition, calling ourselves back to that simple posture of surrender and attention by which we would imply that all we want is God, not for ourselves, but for Himself: *this* is to pray 'the prayer of God,' to place ourselves without reserve in His hands, to make a real (however feeble) beginning of that union with Him in which consists the whole significance of prayer, and which He, if we are faithful, will most indubitably charge Himself to increase and complete.

"We need not, and we should not, wait for a sort of ascetical 'graduation' before we venture to approach God thus. The two themes go together, each abetting and perfecting the other. Indeed it may justly be said that holiness is rather the consequence than the cause of intimacy with God in prayer. And who can doubt that the whole world of souls, too, must profit in every practical way by a prayer whose single import is that God may have His unrestricted way with one at least of them."

PATRICK THOMPSON.

THE INSIGHT OF THE CURÉ D'ARS. By François Trochu. Burns Oates and Washbourne, Ltd. 10s. 6d.

The germ of this work is a chapter of the same author's biography of the Curé d'Ars, and one wonders why it could not have been left at that. For what is here set forth at great length is not a study of the Curé's mind, but a collection of stories, singularly devoid of charm or style, of instances of his second sight, prophecies, thought-reading, etc. A show of careful documentation is made by indicating in great detail by whom, to whom, and when these stories were told, but there is not the slightest attempt to estimate the psychological background and trustworthiness. The book is described by the translator as "the nearest modern approach to the Little Flowers of St. Francis." If that is true, one can only despair of modern spirituality. It is simply a pandering to the craving for the crudely miraculous; there is neither charm nor edification. It also discloses a complete misunderstanding of the significance of the good curé. What made St. John Vianney of outstanding importance was his almost terrific holiness of life and its enormous and widespread power over those who sought him. To shift the whole emphasis on to the inexplicable accompaniments of that power, and to detach these from their context, is to obscure the grace of God. If Canon Trochu and those responsible for the cult at Ars had a tithe of the saint's robust common sense, this book would never have been put together, and one cannot feel that he would have regretted it.

V. I. RUFFER.

GOD WHO CREATED ME. A book for the quiet time. S.P.C.K. on behalf of the Federation of University Women's "Camps" for Schoolgirls. 1s. 6d.

A manual concerning prayer, "written for campers and for all who would know the fulness of life." This book has obviously grown from practical experience, and is therefore unusually good. Intended primarily for those who have taken part in the "camps" for schoolgirls, it should be valuable to any girl in her teens. For it is not just a collection of prayers, but teaches and explains the art of prayer and meditation, without stiffness and alarming technical terms, but with excellent proportion. There are twelve sections, to correspond with the weeks of a school term, each by a different compiler, and each subdivided for the days of the week. (But since when does the week begin on Monday?) There is not too much for each day, but enough that is stimulating and practical, ample to think about and to provoke further thought. And older people might find much that would be helpful, both for teaching and learning.

V. I. RUFFER.

THE MEANING OF MASS. Dogmatic and Devotional Considerations upon the Divine Liturgy. By the Rev. Bede Frost. Mowbray. 3s. 6d.

We fear that this book will scarcely get a fair hearing. It is a theological exposition (in the true sense of the word theological) of the Roman Mass by an Anglican priest. Romans will not see the book: and Anglicans will be put off by the fact that it is an exposition exclusively of the Latin rite, the Prayer Book being left altogether on one side. This will be a pity; for the substance of the book is admirable, and it provides just the sort of thing that we most need. It takes us clean away from the liberalizing corruptions of Christianity which are everywhere around us, into the heart of the Christian Mystery. One cannot but suspect that, for all his avowed preference for the Counter-Reformation, the author really hopes to reach the many Anglican clergy who, while recognizing that the Prayer Book rite alone has for us canonical authority, regard the Latin rite as (for us) the best of commentaries upon it. If only something to this effect could have been said in the Preface, the book might have achieved much. So again, it can hardly be of much use to the laity; for if they are to learn to "pray with the Church," as this book seeks to lead them to do, this can only be through the medium of the Anglican rite. With this limitation of outlook goes a certain exclusivist and sectarian tone; and this again is a pity. A book so orthodox (in the true sense) and so well-written has a mission to fulfil; but it can only fulfil it by shewing, not that the Mystery of the Mass is the exclusive preserve of the people called Catholics, but that it is the true "fulfilment" of all religion that can rightly be called Christian.

A. G. HERBERT, S.S.M.

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